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CHAPTER 1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
The primary focus of this thesis is to apply a relatively new technique, laboratory 
experimental auctions, to examine consumer preferences for food products which have 
not yet reached the market. The laboratory experimental auction method was developed 
by Shogren et fl/.(1994) to estimate willingness to pay for increased levels of food safety. 
It features a Vickrey (1961) second-price auction in which the highest bidder pays an 
amount equal to the second-highest bid and uses real products, real money, and an 
explicit obligation to consume a food product. The Vickrey auction has been shown to 
accurately reveal preferences because it eliminates the incentive to underbid true value 
which is present in a first-price auction. 
Predicting consumer reaction to new products currently relies on hypothetical 
surveys, focus groups, and taste panels. The biases inherent in these hypothetical 
methods can produce misleading results (Whitehead 1991). Thus a producer or processor 
may avoid a new technology because results from biased surveys suggest unfavorable 
consumer reaction. The advantage of experimental auctions is that they are more realistic 
than surveys, taste panels, or focus groups and therefore can provide a more reliable 
assessment of consumer preferences. Better forecasts of consumer reaction reduce 
uncertainty for developers and potential users of new products or processes, and thus 
contribute to better decisions in marketing, promotion, and adoption. 
This thesis investigates consumer preferences for two new food products, bovine 
somatotropin (bST) and irradiated pork, both of which have had substantial time lags 
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between product development and commercialization. Bovine somatotropin is a synthetic 
replicate of a naturally occurring hormone that was developed to boost milk yield in dairy 
cows. It was approved for commercial use by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
in February 1994 but the approval process was considerably delayed, perhaps due to 
objections from consumer advocacy groups. Food irradiation is a process which uses 
electromagnetic energy to kill bacteria thus rendering food safer for human consumption 
and delaying spoilage. Irradiation has been approved for pork since 1987 for control of 
the parasite Trichinella v/hich causes trichinosis. Despite its proven benefits and safety, 
food processors, under threat of consumer boycotts organized by anti-irradiation activists, 
have been reluctant to use irradiation. At present there is only one commercial food 
irradiation facility in the U.S. and only four retail outlets offer irradiated food products. 
Time lags between product development and commercialization impose costs not only 
on product developers but also on society in general because of foregone benefits. For 
example, food irradiation has the potential to significantly reduce the number of deaths 
and illnesses which occur each year from foodbome pathogens. The lack of reliable 
methods for predicting consumer reaction to new products is a contributing factor in these 
time lags. Anti-technology activists can exploit the biases in hypothetical surveys in 
order to convince policy makers and producers that consumers do not want these 
products. Given recent failures with approved products (e.g. breast implants) policy 
makers are less likely to approve new products in the face of what they may perceive as 
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unfavorable public attitudes. Likewise, processors with brand names to protect will avoid 
controversial technologies at the hint of adverse consumer reaction. 
The experimental auction method comes close to replicating the decision making 
process undergone by consumers faced with new food products in retail stores. By 
providing more reliable indications of consumer acceptability of new products, this 
method can mitigate the opportunities for anti-technology activists to exploit uncertainty 
about consumer reactions, enhance the environment in which approval or adoption 
decisions are made, and therefore reduce time lags between product development and 
approval or commercialization. 
Dissertation Organization 
This manuscript consists of three self-contained papers which are linked via 
technique and subject matter. Each paper either has been or will be submitted to an 
economic journal, and thus each follows the format of the relevant journal. The first 
paper, "CVM-X: Calibrating Contingent Values with Experimental Auction Markets," 
uses bids from an experimental auction to calibrate bids from a hypothetical survey. The 
object of valuation is a participant's willingness to pay to upgrade from a typical pork 
sandwich to an irradiated pork sandwich or vice-versa. Comparing values between the 
survey and the experiment demonstrates the extent and direction of bias in hypothetical 
values. 
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The second paper is titled "Effects of Alternative Descriptions of Food Irradiation on 
Preferences for Irradiated Pork in Experimental Auctions." This paper exploits the 
flexibility of the experimental auction method not only to quantify consumer preferences 
but also to investigate the impact of alternative descriptions of the product on those 
preferences. The paper investigates the effect on participants* bids to upgrade from non-
irradiated to irradiated pork of favorable and unfavorable descriptions of the irradiation 
process. The third paper, "Determinants of Consumer Acceptability of Bovine 
Somatotropin," investigates regional differences in consumer acceptability of milk from 
cows treated with bST. Data from experimental auctions is used to investigate the 
relationship between acceptability of "bST milk" and socioeconomic and anthropomorphic 
factors. 
Following the papers is a general summary. References cited in the general 
introduction and general summary are included in the literature cited section. The author 
conducted all of the laboratory experiments on which the papers are based. The first two 
papers were written in consultation with Dr. D. J. Hayes, Dr. J. F. Shogren, and Dr. J. 
B. Kliebenstein. Financial support for this research was provided by the Food Safety 
Consortium. 
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CHAPTER 2. CVM-X; CALIBRATING CONTINGENT VALUES 
WITH EXPERIMENTAL AUCTION MARKETS* 
A paper to be submitted to the American Economic Review 
John A. Fox, Jason F. Shogren, Dermot J. Hayes, 
and James B. Kliebenstein" 
Abstract 
Doubts about the accuracy of values obtained by the contingent valuation method 
(CVM) reflect a need to validate or calibrate those values. We design and implement an 
alternative method, CVM-X, which validates and calibrates values using a laboratory 
experiment. Using bids to upgrade from a typical to an irradiated pork sandwich (and 
vice-versa), we find significant differences between the hypothetical bids obtained in a 
survey and those subsequently obtained in a non-hypothetical laboratory auction with non-
student participants. 
* Journal Paper No. J- of the Iowa Agriculture and Home Economics Experiment Station, Ames, Iowa. 
Project No.2994. We acknowledge the fmancial support of the Food Safety Consortium. We also wish to 
acknowledge helpful comments from Bruce Babcock, Harold Baker, George Beran, Wayne Fuller, Toni Genalo, 
Joe Herriges, Cathy Kling, Jordan Lin, Dennis Olson, and Tanya Roberts. 
** Fox - assistant professor. Department of Agricultural Economics, Kansas State University, Manhattan, KS 
66502; Shogren and Hayes - associate professors, Kliebenstein - professor. Department of Economics, Iowa 
State University, Ames, lA 50011. Fox was a graduate assistant at Iowa State University when this research 
was completed. 
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Introduction 
Do people actually do what they say they will? This remains the central question in 
the debate over the contingent valuation (CVM) of nonmarket goods (see the recent 
exchange between Diamond/Hausman and Hanemann). If people do what they say, there 
is no problem, and economic values elicited from hypothetical questions can provide 
useful information. If they do not, problems will ensue. Existing data suggest they do 
not - hypothetical bids tend to overstate "real" values obtained in actual markets (see 
Bishop and Heberlien; Bohm; Boyce and McCollum; Dickie et al.\ Duffield and 
Patterson; Kealy et al.', Neill et al.\ Seip and Strand; Shogren (1991); Shogren and 
Crocker).' Consequently, in its proposed regulations for natural resource damage 
assessment, the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) has 
recommended that CVM values be deflated by a default factor of fifty percent unless they 
can be calibrated to actual market data. This arbitrary default factor will serve as a 
guideline until it can be determine if there is a systematic bias in hypothetical behavior 
' For example, Neill et al. (1994) found CVM bids for a framed picture significantly greater than those 
elicited in a real second-price auction. Duffield and Patterson compared contingent values and actual 
contributions for a water leasing trust iiind fmding that the average contribution was similar across surveys but 
that the survey requesting a contribution had a much lower participation rate. Similarly, Boyce and McCollum 
(1993) concluded that their hypothetical market for bison hunting permits overestimated true value primarily 
due to the lower preponderance of zero bids. The NOAA panel (Arrow et al.) recognized an upward bias in 
the CVM and their recommendations stress conservative design wherever possible. The panel also stressed the 
importance of validation: "External validation of the CV method remains an important issue. A critically 
important contribution could come from experiments in which state-of-the-art CV studies are employed in 
contexts where they can in fact be compared with "real" behavioral willingness to pay for goods that can 
actually be bought and sold." 
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that can be statistically measured and corrected with a calibration function (see Blackburn 
et ah). 
This paper introduces the concept of CVM-X into the calibration debate. CVM-X, 
as defined by Shogren (1993), consists of four basic steps. First, run a CVM survey and 
elicit hypothetical values for the good in question. Second, bring subsamples of the 
CVM respondents into the laboratory and elicit real bids for the actual good in an 
incentive compatible auction that employs real goods, real money, and repeated market 
experience. Experimental markets provide people with a well-defined incentive structure 
that enables the researcher to more accurately elicit the value of a nonmarket good, 
product, or process (Coursey). Third, estimate a calibration function relating the auction 
market bids of the subsample to their hypothetical bids (and other factors if appropriate). 
Fourth, use the estimated calibration function to adjust the values of CVM respondents 
who did not participate in the laboratory auction. Implicit in CVM-X is a test of validity 
since we can directly compare hypothetical bids with those elicited under non-hypothetical 
conditions in the laboratory. The idea is that CVM-X can be a cost-effective tool that 
combines the advantages of CVM and experimental auction markets, increasing the 
validity and accuracy of surveys while broadening the scope of nonmarket valuation in 
the lab. 
We apply the CVM-X method to the valuation of reduced risk of food-borne illness 
achieved with food irradiation. Our results show a hypothetical bias of approximately 10 
percent in the median bid to upgrade from a non-irradiated to an irradiated pork 
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sandwich, and a bias of almost 50 percent in the median bid to upgrade from an 
irradiated sandwich to a non-irradiated sandwich. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the 
application of the CVM-X method to consumer acceptance of food irradiation, and 
outlines the analytical framework underlying the elicited values. The third section 
describes the four-step implementation and the results from the CVM-X application. We 
offer our conclusions in the final section. 
CVM-X Application: Trichinella Risk and Food Irradiation 
The objective individual chance of infection from the food-borne pathogen 
Trichinella is approximately 1 in 2,400 annually. Of those individuals who do get sick, 
one out of one hundred will die from the illness (Bennett et al.). In response to this risk, 
the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has recently approved irradiation 
treatment of pork to control Trichinella. Irradiation of pork products can reduce by 
greater than 99 percent the viability of Trichinella organisms present in the meat (Brake 
et al.). While most scientist agree that products treated by irradiation are completely 
safe, opponents of irradiation still call for more research on potentially harmful effects. 
Food irradiation has been approved for a number of products, and market tests 
with irradiated fruit have indicated a high degree of acceptability to consumers.^ 
However, irradiated foods are not yet widely available in the U.S., and many people are 
^ An in-store study on consumer response to irradiated papayas in California indicated a high degree of 
acceptance (Bruhn and Noell). 
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unfamiliar with the process thereby giving it a feature common to many CVM goods.' 
This lack of familiarity and the ability to represent risk reduction in a tangible, private 
good that can be bought and sold on the auction block makes irradiated pork a salient 
product for testing the CVM-X method. 
Following Buhr et al., we use a split-valuation design with two experimental 
treatments to separate and value the positive and negative attributes of food irradiation. 
Consider an agent endowed with a non-irradiated pork sandwich which has a 1 in 2.6 
million chance of causing trichinosis (see Shin et al.). A representative individual's 
expected utility, EU;, given a non-irradiated pork sandwich is 
eIj. = n. + (l-rt) U(M,H) (1) 
where M denotes wealth. So a state of food borne illness, H a state of health, and tt; is 
the individual's subjective probability of contracting trichinosis that allows for combining 
prior perceptions with the risk information provided (see Hayes et at). Assume U(M, So) 
< U(M, H). 
Now allow the agent to exchange the non-irradiated sandwich for an irradiated 
sandwich that has zero probability of causing trichinosis. Because Trichinella is now 
rarely found in pigs in the United States and because it takes a fairly substantial number 
of viable organisms to cause trichinosis, we were comfortable with offering participants a 
' Irradiated food products are currently available at only 4 retail outlets in the United States; 3 in Florida, 
1 in Illinois. 
10 
guarantee that the consumption of an irradiated pork sandwich would not result in 
trichinosis. But since the individual may perceive other risks associated with irradiation, 
i.e. cancer, his or her expected utility with the irradiated sandwich is 
EU^ = e, U(M-R^,S;) + (1-0^) (2) 
where Rj (Ri>0) is the ex ante willingness to pay or the option price bid to upgrade to 
the irradiated sandwich, Si is a state of illness associated with irradiation, and 6-^ is the 
agents' subjective probability of contracting some illness associated with irradiation. The 
implied assumption is that in a state of health, the agent is indifferent to having consumed 
a non-irradiated or an irradiated sandwich. 
The bid, R;, equalizes expected utility from both sandwiches 
7t. l/(M,5o) + ( l - n )  U i M J I )  = 0, + (1-0^) V(M-R^,H) (3) 
A positive bid occurs if 
I t .  U { M ^ ^  +  (1-u^) U(M,H) < + (1-0.) U(,M,H) (4) 
If iri<^i, the agent's subjective probability of contracting trichinosis does not exceed 
that of contracting an illness associated with the irradiated sandwich, and it can be shown 
that a necessary condition for a positive bid is U(M,Sq) < U(M,S,), i.e., utility is lower 
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when ill from trichinosis than when ill from a condition associated with irradiation. If 
7ri>0i, there will be a positive bid unless utility when ill from trichinosis exceeds by a 
certain amount that when ill from a condition associated with irradiation. 
Implementation and Results 
Step 1 - The Survey 
The starting sample was restricted to 250 residents of the local county. Because the 
initial contact was made by letter, the sample was selected from telephone directory 
listings rather than from all potential telephone numbers as in random digit dialing 
procedures. We mailed an introductory letter explaining the nature of the survey for 
which the subject had been selected. We subsequently made telephone contact with 208 
subjects, from which we obtained 182 interviews, a response rate of 87.5 percent. We 
sought as participants those most responsible for food shopping within the household. 
The survey instrument was developed with input from statisticians, veterinarians, and 
food scientists experienced in survey design and food safety. Pretesting was conducted, 
following which minor changes were made to the descriptions of irradiation and 
trichinosis, and the order of two questions was reversed. A training session was 
conducted with professionals interviewers prior to the pretest."* 
The survey began with attitudinal questions related to diet and food safety. 
Demographic information was collected at the end. Following descriptions of trichinosis 
* The introductory letter and survey instrument ai^ contained in Appendix A. 
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and food irradiation, participants were offered a hypothetical choice between a sandwich 
made with irradiated pork meat described as having a zero chance of causing trichinosis, 
and a typical sandwich with non-irradiated pork described as having a 1 in 2.6 million 
chance of causing trichinosis. Table 1 shows that of the 174 pork-eaters in the sample, 
131 (75 percent) indicated a preference for the irradiated pork sandwich. Previous 
surveys on acceptability of irradiated meat products have found similar results. For 
example, a national survey conducted for the American Meat Institute (1993) observed 
that 60 percent of participants said they were willing to pay 10 cents more for irradiated 
hamburger if irradiation reduced bacteria levels. In our survey, we deliberately excluded 
the "no preference" option although this answer was all we could elicit from four 
participants. 
Using an open-ended valuation question, each participant was then asked to reveal 
the maximum he or she would be willing to pay to upgrade from their less preferred 
sandwich to their sandwich of choice.^ Among the 131 pork eaters preferring the 
irradiated sandwich, the average hypothetical bid to upgrade was $0.61. Of the 38 
preferring non-irradiated, the average bid to upgrade to a non-irradiated sandwich was 
^ There remains some debate over the appropriate choice of valuation question. Some argue that the 
closed-ended or discrete choice approach is more appropriate since it is easier for participants to understand, 
while others argue that open-ended is more appropriate because it provides more information. Recently, 
Cununings et al. (1992) found that the discrete choice method tends to overstate true willingness to pay. 
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$0.58. Note that two participants refused to submit a bid, both stating that they would 
pay "a lot more" for the non-irradiated sandwich.® 
At the end of the interview, participants who were pork eaters were asked if they 
would participate in a consumer economics experiment in return for a payment of $30.00. 
Those interested were asked to give a convenient time for participation. The interviewers 
made no connection between the interview and the experiment. If asked, they informed 
subjects, honestly, that they did not know anything about the experiments. Of the 174 
eligible, 130 indicated they would be willing to participate. When contacted about 
possible dates for an experiment, 48 subjects had either changed their minds or were 
unavailable (see Table 1). 
Table 2 shows the mean and median bids and some demographic characteristics for 
the two groups and for the subgroups participating in experiments. Figures 1 and 2 
illustrate the distributions of hypothetical bids. Participation rates were similar between 
the two groups - 58 of 131 preferring irradiated (44 percent) and 20 of 38 preferring non 
irradiated (53 percent). Since we wanted to include as many participants as possible in 
the experiments, we did not select on the basis of demographic or socio-economic 
characteristics. Table 2 and Figures 1 and 2 indicate, however, that our subsamples were 
representative of the larger groups. 
^ Both subjects agreed to participate in experiments. They were taken aside during the experiment and 
told that in order to continue, they had to give a dollar bid. One gave a bid of $1.00, and the other $20.00. 
Bids from these two subjects are not included in any tables or statistical analysis. 
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Step 2 - The Experimental Auctions 
Using Buhr et al.'s split-valuation design, we assigned participants to one of two 
treatments given their preference for the two types of pork sandwiches - the Irradiated 
treatment and the Non-irradiated treatment.' Those preferring irradiated pork were 
assigned to the Irradiated treatment, and were endowed with a non-irradiated sandwich 
and given the opportunity to bid for an irradiated sandwich. Those preferring non-
irradiated pork were assigned to the Non-irradiated treatment, and were endowed with an 
irradiated sandwich and given the opportunity to bid for a non-irradiated sandwich. 
For both treatments, the general procedures of the experimental auctions followed 
Shogren et al. (1994a). Each treatment had two stages. In stage one, participants were 
familiarized with the auction mechanism by auctioning brand name candy bars. Over five 
trials, each participant submitted a sealed bid to exchange his/her endowed candy bar for 
the auctioned candy bar. Following each trial, the I.D. number(s) of the highest 
bidder(s) and the market price were displayed. After all five trials, we controlled for 
wealth effects by randomly selecting one of the five trials to be the binding trial that 
determined who would receive the auctioned candy bar. 
Stage two introduced the meat products. Each auction (except in group 10) consisted 
of 10 trials, each with a uniform chance of being randomly selected as the binding trial. 
' We use the term treatment to refer to the two main types of experiment - one involving bids for 
irradiated pork, the other involving bids for non-irradiated pork. The subtreatments are the different types of 
auction mechanism employed i.e., 2nd price auction, random n"* price auction, and one-shot. We use the term 
group or experiment to refer to the individual experimental units of which there are 10. 
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Following each trial, the I.D. number of the highest bidder and the market price from the 
auction were publicly displayed. Participants had previously been informed that they 
would have to eat a sandwich in order to leave with their income. All sessions were run 
at a meat tasting laboratory at a major midwestem university. 
At the beginning of stage two, participants were given a note reminding them of their 
hypothetical bid from the telephone survey.® They were informed that their hypothetical 
bid would be their non-hypothetical bid for trial 1 of the auction. After the winner's I.D. 
number and market price for trial 1 were posted, they were then asked to bid in trial 2. 
The auction proceeded until trial 5, when participants were given a guided tour of a food 
irradiation facility, and a detailed description of the food irradiation process. Questions 
about the irradiation process were answered at that time. Subjects then returned to the 
auction room, and restarted their bidding for trials 6 through 10. Note that for group 10 
there was a one-shot auction, which did not have ten trials. Instead, participants bid once 
in the belief that it would be their only bid. The winner's I.D. number and market price 
were posted and participants were then given the tour of the irradiation facility, following 
which they were allowed to change their previous bids. 
® Reminding participants of their hypothetical bids could bias our results in favor of the CVM if subjects 
are unwilling to change their bid i.e., unwilling to admit that they were wrong on the survey, not wishing to 
appear foolish etc. This did not appear to be a problem - SO of 78 experimental subjects changed their bid 
between trials 1 and 2, 29 of those by $0.25 or more. Of 58 subjects in the Irradiated treatment, only 10 
(17%) kept the same bid between the survey, the 2nd trial, and the fmal bid. In the Non-Irradiated treatment, 
6 of 20 (30%) participants maintained the same bid. 
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Groups 1,2,3,4 and 10 used a Vickrey second price, sealed bid auction mechanism. 
In the second price auction, the highest bidder in the binding trial purchased the product 
at a price equal to the amount of the second highest bid. Groups 5,6,7,8, and 9 used a 
variant of the Vickrey auction - a random n"' price auction (see Shogren et al. 1994b). 
With the random n"* price mechanism there is a uniform chance within each trial that the 
auction will be a second, third, fourth, etc. highest bid auction. For example, if, in the 
binding trial, the auction had been randomly drawn to be a fourth price auction, then the 
three highest bidders would purchase the good at a price equal to the fourth highest bid. 
See Appendix B for a transcript of the experimental instructions. 
Tables 3a and 3b summarize the groups and provide the bidding patterns in trial 1 
(hypothetical), trial 2, and trial 10. Figures 3 and 4 plot the mean bid over all 10 trials 
for each group. For the three groups in the Non-irradiated treatment, the mean 
hypothetical bid exceeded that of trials 2 and 10. Note that in two of the three groups, 
the mean bid gradually fell between trials 1 and 10. In the third, group 7, there was a 
sudden drop between trial 1 and 2 followed by a gradual recovery until trial 10. In the 
Irradiated treatment, the mean hypothetical bid exceeded the mean bid in trial 2 in all 7 
groups, and exceeded the mean bid in trial 10 in 5 of the 7 groups. 
For groups in the Irradiated treatment, information about irradiation after trial 5 
appears to have had minimal impact on mean bids. The exception appears to be group 1 
where the mean bid increased in trial 6 but declined in trial 7. This movement in the 
mean is attributable to one bidder. These patterns suggest that repeated market 
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experience accounts for most of the movement in mean bids between trials 2 and 10. In 
group 8 in the Non-irradiated treatment there appears to be a downward shift in the mean 
bid in response to new information - evidence that the new information reassured some 
bidders of the safety of the irradiated product. 
Comparison of Survey and Experiment Table 4 shows mean and median bids and 
the variance of bids taken across all individuals in both treatments. Because some 
participants (18 of 53 bidding for irradiated pork in multiple trial experiments, 8 of 20 
bidding for non-irradiated pork) did not lock in a constant bid, we did not use trial 10 to 
represent the final experienced bid. Instead we used an average over trials 8, 9, and 10 
because the variability of participants bids between trials was minimized over this three 
trial interval. 
For the first four auction trials (trial 2 to trial 5), participants were given essentially 
the same information about food irradiation and trichinosis as was given to them in the 
telephone survey. The only extra information participants had when they submitted their 
first auction bid was the I.D. number of the highest bidder and the amount of the second 
highest bid in their group. The differences in bidding between the survey (trial 1) and 
the first auction trial (trial 2) for the most part represent the effect of placing survey 
participants in a non-hypothetical situation. Table 4 shows that the difference between 
the survey and trial 2 is greater in the Non-irradiated treatment. 
Also note in Table 4 the reduction in the variance of bids between the survey and 
auction which we illustrate for three groups in Figure 5. This reflects the increased 
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precision of the non-hypothetical auction bids. If there is an incentive for strategic over-
or under-bidding in the hypothetical survey, we would expect real values to have a tighter 
distribution than hypothetical values. The reduction in variance is more pronounced in 
the Non-irradiated treatment where we suspected the potential for strategic overbidding to 
be greatest. The Moses test for equality of dispersion parameters indicated that the 
reduction in variability was significant at the 0.05 level in both treatments.' Similar 
reductions in variance have been reported elsewhere, see for example Schulze et al. or 
Shogren(1990). 
a) Bids for Non-Irradiated Pork: Figure 6 shows the distributions of trial 1 
(hypothetical), trial 2, and final (avg. 8-10) bids to upgrade to a non-irradiated sandwich. 
The average final bid of $0.25 is less than half the average hypothetical bid of $0.67. 
Much of this discrepancy can be attributed to one bidder with a $5.00 hypothetical bid 
and consistent zero bids in the experiment. There is also a discrepancy in median bids -
$0.20 in the survey compared to $0.01 in final bids. However, with one participant 
recording a substantial increase between survey and experiment, from zero to $1.10, the 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test did not reject equality of the distributions (Table 5). 
Correlation between hypothetical and final bids, as measured by the Spearman rank 
correlation coefficient, was low at .27 and not significant (p > 0.20). 
^ We used the nonparametric test since the F test is unreliable when the populations of interest are not 
normally distributed. (See Daniel, p92) 
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b) Bids for Irradiated Pork: Figure 7 shows the distributions of bids to upgrade to an 
irradiated pork sandwich. The median bid falls from $0.50 in the survey to $0.30 in trial 
2, then increases to $0.42 in final experienced bids. The Wilcoxon test rejects equality 
of the distributions for hypothetical and trial 2 bids, and also for trial 2 and final bids. It 
appears that placing subjects in the non-hypothetical auction environment affects bidding 
behavior, as does repeated experience with the auction market. The correlation between 
hypothetical and final bids is again quite low at 0.41 (p < 0.002). 
Sensitivity to Outliers Much attention has been given to the treatment of outliers in 
contingent valuation studies, and cases occur where conclusions may rest on their 
inclusion/exclusion (Gregory and Furby). To account for this issue we have focused the 
analysis on medians and used nonparametric tests. 
A potential advantage of the CVM-X procedure is that, in the context of relating 
hypothetical bids to "real" bids, it allows one to identify outliers and protest bids. A case 
in point is the hypothetical bid of $5.00 for the non-irradiated sandwich which reduces to 
zero in the auction. Without knowing that the market bid was in fact zero, $5.00 might 
not have been considered unrealistic as a bid to avoid eating irradiated pork. 
In this particular study there seems to be a greater tendency to overstate the 
hypothetical bid on the part of subjects bidding to acquire the non-irradiated sandwich. 
Even with the elimination of the $5.00 bid, the mean hypothetical bid ($0.44) is 65 
percent larger than the mean final bid ($0.27). The proportion bidding zero remains 
almost constant, so the decrease is due to the scaling back of higher bids. It appears as 
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though there may be an element of protest built into the larger hypothetical bids to 
demonstrate disapproval for the irradiation process. 
Another example of a protest bid was provided by one of the two participants who 
refused to state a bid in the survey. Before the experimental auction the subject was 
reminded of the survey question and asked if she could provide a bid. Based on her 
perceptions of food irradiation at that time she had serious doubts about the safety of the 
process. As a result, she found it difficult to formulate a bid, explaining that it was 
impossible to value a human life. Finally, the bid of $20.00 was given. In the 
experimental auction the bid quickly fell to $1.00 in trial 2 and to $0.02 by the end of the 
experiment. In this case, the true bid was overstated in the survey by a factor of a 
thousand. 
Step 3 - The Calibration Function 
Figures 8 and 9 illustrate how individuals' hypothetical bids compare with their 
experienced final bids from the experimental auction. While the distributions of bids 
appear similar between the survey and experiment, there are substantial differences at the 
individual level. As noted above, we calculated the correlation coefficients between final 
and hypothetical bids at 0.41 in the Irradiation treatment and 0.27 in the Non-irradiation 
treatment. 
For participants in the Irradiated treatment the calibration function that relates 
hypothetical bids, HYPj, to market bids, FINAL;, is 
FINA^ = a + Pi HYP^ + pj 72 + P3 73 + e (5) 
where T2 and T3 are dummy variables for the random n"* price and one-shot sub-
treatments. Table 6 presents the calibration function results. The intercept term and the 
coefficient on the hypothetical bid are both positive and significant for bids for irradiated 
pork. We reject the hypothesis that final bids equal hypothetical bids (a = 0, b,= 1). 
Likewise, we reject the NOAA default calibration level (a = 0, bi = 0.5). Models lb 
and Ic reflect the effects of sub-treatments and groups. The coefficients suggest a 
tendency for subjects in the random n"* price and "one-shot" sub-treatments to have lower 
final bids, but these effects are not statistically significant. Group effects are statistically 
significant in two cases. 
Models 2a and 2b suggest that group effects are important among the subjects 
bidding for non-irradiated pork. In both models the coefficient on the hypothetical bid is 
negative reflecting the poor correlation between final and hypothetical bids. Elimination 
of the outlying bid ($5.00) had a small effect, with the intercept changing to 0.26 (t = 
2.49) and the slope coefficient becoming positive (0.02) but remaining statistically 
insignificant (t = 0.15). 
Step 4 - Hypothetical Bid Calibration 
We applied the calibration function (Model la) to the bids of the 131 subjects who 
preferred irradiated pork. Calibration resulted in a mean bid of $0.48 compared to the 
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survey mean of $0.61. The calibrated median bid was $0.46, implying that the survey, 
with a median at $0.50, overestimated median willingness to pay by approximately 9 
percent. 
To calibrate bids from the Non-irradiated treatment we used coefficients resulting 
from elimination of the outlying bid (a = 0.26, b, = 0.02). Calibration with these 
coefficients resulted in a mean bid of $0.27 down from the survey mean of $0.58. The 
calibrated median was $0.27 down from $0.45. The NOAA default calibration of 50 
percent appears to be appropriate in this situation. 
Are hypothetical bids biased? At the individual level, the answer must be "yes". Of 
58 participants in the Irradiated treatment, 23 (40 percent) decreased their bid between 
the survey and trial 2 by an average of $0.51, while 14 participants (24 percent) 
increased their bid by an average of $0.16. As the experiment proceeded, bids increased, 
and the final bids in the experiment corresponded quite closely, on average, to those in 
the hypothetical survey. 
In the Irradiated treatment we can regard the deviations between survey and 
experimental bids as being due to hypothetical bias in the true random sense (Mitchell 
and Carson, pl91). There is no motivation to underbid strategically for a preferred 
private good in either treatment. Strategic underbidding (or protest zeros) commonly 
occurs when subjects believe that they should not have to pay for the good in question, 
e.g. improved air quality. They underbid their true value because they feel that someone 
else should pay. With a private good - in this case one that has been identified as being 
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preferred to an endowed alternative - this motivation to underbid is absent. We also 
believe that there are few in the general public who feel strongly enough about the need 
for food irradiation that they would overbid strategically in the Irradiated treatment. 
Thus the errors in hypothetical bids are random and probably occur due to the lack of 
market discipline. 
However, we do believe that in the Non-irradiated treatment, where participants are 
bidding to avoid the irradiated product, there is motivation for some subjects to overbid 
strategically in the survey. For these subjects, larger hypothetical bids allow them the 
opportunity to demonstrate their disapproval of food irradiation. In the Non-irradiated 
treatment, the upward bias in hypothetical bids compared with trial 2 occurs not because 
the number of overbidders exceeds the number of underbidders, but because of the 
magnitude of the overbids. There were 5 hypothetical overbids averaging $2.04 
compared to 8 hypothetical underbids averaging $0.23. The incentive to overbid 
strategically produces the upward bias in the survey values. 
To summarize - in the Irradiated treatment, the survey provided a reasonable 
estimate (within 10 percent) of true median willingness to pay in the absence of strategic 
overbidding. In the Non-irradiated treatment, the NOAA calibration (50%) provided a 
reasonable adjustment to mean or median willingness to pay in the presence of strategic 
overbidding. However, in neither treatment did the survey or NOAA calibration provide 
reasonable estimates of individual willingness to pay. 
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Conclusions 
We have demonstrated how the CVM-X method can be used to verify and calibrate 
contingent values with experimental auction markets. Using a randomly selected sample 
of adult subjects, we found that the average respondent asked to value an upgrade from 
typical to irradiated pork (and vice versa) bid more in a hypothetical survey than in a 
non-hypothetical laboratory auction with real monetary incentives. The upward bias in 
hypothetical bids was greater in the sample bidding to avoid the irradiated pork. Our 
calibration procedure led us to conclude that the hypothetical median bid for irradiated 
pork was overstated by about 9 percent ($0.46 vs. $0.50) and the median bid for non-
irradiated pork overstated by about 70 percent ($0.27 vs. $0.45). 
One can argue that the test of validity entailed in the CVM-X method is a test of 
convergent rather than criterion validity'" since valuation in the lab may be subject to its 
own set of biases. Smith (1992) takes a rather pessimistic view - "Accuracy is 
impossible to judge because economists can never know the "true" values people place on 
any commodity - marketed or nonmarketed." Regardless, we believe that an 
experimental market using an incentive compatible auction gets about as close as one 
reasonably can to "true" values. Furthermore, the CVM-X method uses within-subject 
comparisons, the advantages Smith notes in the same article. We conclude, based on the 
Convergent validity refers to a situation in which neither of two measures is assumed to be a truer 
measure of the underlying construct than the other. With convergent validity the appropriate question is 
whether the measure (hypothetical bid) is correlated with another measure (auction bid) of the same theoretical 
construct (true willingness to pay). Criterion validity assumes that the alternative measure (auction bid) 
accurately represents the theoretical construct (true willingness to pay). See Mitchell and Carson, p 190-209. 
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low level of correlation between the hypothetical and experimental values, that our survey 
failed to measure accurately individual willingness to pay for a private risk reduction. 
These results show that estimates of use value for a private good are not generally 
immune to systematic bias. 
An important feature of CVM-X is that it allows for the provision of substantially 
more information and context (for a subsample of participants) than would be possible in 
any large survey. In our application, participants in the subsample were shown an actual 
food irradiation facility. The laboratory setting, with subjects who have made and been 
compensated for a time commitment, provides an opportunity to elicit values under 
conditions of full information and complete attention. A related advantage is that 
calibration of values based on appropriately selected subsamples provides for substantial 
cost savings in contingent valuation surveys by avoiding the need for large scale personal 
interviewing. As always with experimental methods, replication allows testing for the 
robustness of the outcome. 
The primary aim of this paper is to present an application of the CVM-X method. 
Our application does not, nor do most CVM studies, adequately account for substitution 
possibilities. In the context of this exercise, substitutes would include private risk 
reduction strategies (cook your own pork) and alternative public interventions such as 
HACCP (Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point) procedures. Substitution 
possibilities have been incorporated in experimental auctions (see Shogren et al. [1994c]), 
and need to be explored in our context as well. 
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So where do we go from here? CVM practitioners are, of course, primarily 
interested in public goods and programs, items generally lacking the deliverability of a 
pork sandwich. Application of CVM-X to the domain of public goods requires 
deliverable surrogates - an example is provided by Harrison et al.'s use of local wetiands 
in the bias function approach to calibration. We envision a combination of CVM-X and 
bias functions in which a series of CVM-X studies would value progressively larger 
amounts of the public good. For example, to value wetiands preservation first apply 
CVM-X to one acre of wetiand, then 10 acres, 100 acres, and so on up to a realistic 
maximum. For each CVM-X calculate the required calibration function and test for 
transferability to the next level. Use of CVM-X in this manner can provide the 
appropriate calibration for a survey valuing national wetiands preservation. 
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Figure 1: Distributions of hypothetical bids to upgrade to irradiated pork. 
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Figure 2: Distributions of hypothetical bids to upgrade to non-irradiated pork. 
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Figure 3: Average bid to upgrade to irradiated pork. 
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Figure 4: Average bid to upgrade to non-irradiated pork. 
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Figure 5: Variance of bids for selected experiments. 
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Figure 8: Hypothetical and final bids to upgrade to irradiated pork. Ranked by 
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Table 1: Summary of the CVM-X Survey. 
Preference Irradiated Non-Irradiated No 
Preference 
Total 
Participated 58 22 2 82 
Later 
Declined 
39 8 1 48 
"No" up front 34 10 0 44 
Non pork eater 6 1 1 8 
Total 137 41 4 182 
Note: Of the 22 people preferring non-irradiated pork who actually participated in 
experiments, 2 had refused to give a hypothetical bid in the survey. At the beginning of 
the experiment, when pressed for their WTP value, their hypothetical bids were $1.00 
and $20.00. Bids from those 2 participants are not included in subsequent tables nor in 
the statistical analyses. 
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Table 2: Selected Characteristics of Survey Participants. 
Preference Irradiated Pork Non-Irradiated Pork 
Variable N = 131 Laboratory N = 38 Laboratory 
Subsample Subsample 
(N=58) (N=20) 
Age 43.4 39.7 41.4 40.7 
Sex (% male) .32 .33 .26 .20 
Education 5.1 5.3 5.1 5.3 
Income 3.5 3.5 3.8 4.1 
Average Bid $0.61 $0.58 $0.58 $0.67 
(Variance) (0.94) (0.34) (0.85) (1.37) 
Median Bid $0.50 $0.50 $0.45 $0.20 
Zero Bids(%) 18 (.14) 7 (.12) 15 (.39) 10 (.50) 
Description of Variables: 
Age Actual age in years. 
Sex Categorical variable: 0 if female, 1 if male. 
Education Categorical variable: I = Grade 8 or less; 2 = Grades 9-11; 3 = High school 
grad.; 4 = Some technical, trade, or business school; 5 = Some college, no 
degree; 6 = College graduate; 7 = Some graduate work; 8 = Masters degree; 
9 = Ph.D, D.V.M., D.D.S., M.D., etc. 
Income Categorical variable: 1 = less than $10,000; 2 = $10,000 to $20,000; .... 6 = 
$50,000 to $70,000; 7 = $70,000 to $100,000; 8 = more than $100,000. 
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Table 3: Summary of Experiments. 
3a. Bidding to upgrade to Irradiated. 
No. Group N Trial 1 
Mean 
Median 
(Var) 
Trial 2 
Mean 
Median 
(Var) 
Trial 10 
Mean 
Median 
(Var) 
1 A 5 1.40 
1.00 
(0.94) 0.67 
0.50 
(0.52) 0.34 
0.45 
(0.04) 
2 A 11 0.62 
0.50 
(0.33) 0.48 
0.50 
(0.09) 0.68 
0.75 
(0.18) 
3 A 8 0.38 
0.28 
(0.07) 0.27 
0.25 
(0.02) 0.30 
0.35 
(0.02) 
4 A 13 0.44 
0.25 
(0.16) 0.39 
0.30 
(0.14) 0.66 
0.50 
(0.33) 
5 B 7 0.42 
0.25 
(0.16) 0.36 
0.30 
(0.09) 0.27 
0.30 
(0.01) 
6 B 9 0.56 
0.50 
(0.34) 0.32 
0.25 
(0.03) 0.50 
0.50 
(0.06) 
10 C 5 0.60 
0.50 
(0.04) 0.26 
0.25 
(0.03) 0.23 
0.25 
(0.03) 
3b. Bidding to upgrade to Non-irradiated. 
No. Group N Trial 1 
Mean 
Median 
(Var) 
Trial 2 
Mean 
Median 
(Var) 
Trial 10 
Mean 
Median 
(Var) 
7 B 7 1.13 
0.50 
(2.57) 0.26 
0.25 
(0.06) 0.70 
0.70 
(0.14) 
8 B 5 0.50 
0 
(0.60) 0.38 
0.25 
(0.13) 0.07 
0.05 
(0.01) 
9 B 8 0.38 
0 
(0.48) 0.16 
0 
(0.11) 0.03 
0 
(0.01) 
Note: Trial 1 is the hypothetical bid from telephone survey. Group A is the Vickrey 2nd price 
auction with 10 trials. Group B is the Vickrey random n"" price auction with 10 trials. 
Group C is the Vickrey 2nd price "one-shot" auction in which Trial 2 is represented by 
the first non-hypothetical bid and Trial 10 by the revised bid. 
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Table 4: Comparison of Hypothetical and Experimental Auction Bids. 
Preference Irradiated (N=58) Non-Irradiated (N=20) 
Survey Trial 2 Final Survey Trial 2 Final 
Mean Bid 0.58 0.39 0.48 0.67 0.25 0.25 
Variance 0.34 0.12 0.15 1.36 0.10 0.12 
Median 0.50 0.30 0.42 0.20 0.05 0.01 
Zero bids 7 6 6(6)- 10 8 9(10) 
Note: Trial 2 is the first non-hypothetical auction bid. The final bid is an average over trials 8 
to 10 except for Experiment 10 where it is represented by the revised "one-shot" bid. 
* Averaging over the three final trials may hide zero bids for some participants who have not 
locked in at their final bid. The number in parentheses is the average number of zero bids 
received in trials 8, 9, and 10. 
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Table 5: Comparison of Distributions with Wilcoxon signed-rank test. 
Null Hypothesis Hypothet. — Trial 2 Hypothet. = Final Trial 2 = Final 
Bids for N' 13 N 13 N 12 
Non-Irrad. Min(TT+) 39 Min(TT+) 35 Min(TT^) 35 
Result Accept Result Accept Result Accept 
Bids for N 37 N 48 N 36 
Irradiated 7} 3.02 Z 1.01 Z 2.74 
Result Reject Result Accept Result Reject 
Note: N is the effective number of observations after deleting ties. For N > 15 the 
distribution of T is assumed to be approximately normal. (Freund and Walpole, p527). 
Rejections are valid at the 0.01 level of significance. 
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Table 6: Comparing Final and Hypothetical Bids. 
Variables Bids for Irradiated Bids for Non-Irradiated 
OLS Regression Coefficients 
Model lA Model IB Model IC Model 2A Model 2B 
Constant .36 (5.20) .43 (5.41) .03 (.14) .28 (2.99) .76 (9.31) 
Hyp.Bid .20 (2.35) .19 (2.30) .26 (2.95) -.04 (-.53) -.12 (-3.11) 
T2 -.13 (-1.2) 
T3 -.32 (-1.8) .05 (.20) 
Group 2 .49 (2.48) 
Group 3 .18 (.81) 
Group 4 .50 (2.51) 
Group 5 .13 (.59) 
Group 6 .32 (1.54) 
Group 8 -.63 (-5.70) 
Group 9 -.67 (-6.76) 
N 58 58 58 20 20 
Standard Error .38 .37 .35 .36 .18 
Log likelihood -24.76 -22.69 16.44 -7.07 7.52 
R2 
.09 .15 .32 .02 .77 
Note: T2 represents the random N"* price auction. T3 represents the "One-shot" auction in 
Experiment 10. t statistics are given in parentheses. 
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Appendix A 
Introductory Letter and Survey 
October 28, 1993 
Mr.OO 
( ) 
( ) 
Dear Q (), 
The Economics Department at Iowa State University is conducting a study with Story County 
residents regarding their knowledge, opinions and concerns related to food safety. 
Your household was scientifically selected to be included in this study and we would be grateliil 
for your help. Within the next two weeks you will be contacted by telephone and the person who 
is most responsible for food purchases in your home will be asked to participate in a brief 
telephone interview. This will take 5-10 minutes. There are no risks to participants in the project 
and your voluntary participation is extremely important to the study. Any information provided 
will be kept strictly confidential and released in summary form with information from all who are 
interviewed. 
We hope that you will take a few minutes of your time to assist us with this study which will 
improve our understanding of people's concerns about the many issues related to food safety in 
our country. If you have any questions regarding the study, please call Toni Genalo, Project 
Coordinator, at 515-294-5244, and she will be happy to help you. Thank you for your 
consideration. 
Sincerely, 
Dermot Hayes, Ph.D. 
Associate Professor 
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Food Safety Study 
Statistical Laboratory, Iowa State University 
& The Department of Economics 
Int. ID# _ 
Date Interviewed: /_ 
Food Purchaser's Name: 
a.m. 
Start Time: : 
p.m. 
Day Date Time Int. Outcome 
/ 
• / 
/ 
/ 
/ 
Hello, this is (vour name) calling from the Statistics Department at Iowa State University. Is this 
the (name') residence? Recently, Iowa State University sent you a letter about a research study we 
are conducting for the Economics Department about food safety. 
1. Did you receive this letter? 
1 = Yes 
2 = No -*• 
3 = Don't know 
EXPLAIN PROJECT - READ 
LETTER IF NECESSARY. 
As the letter stated, we would like to talk to the person in your household who is most 
responsible for purchasing food. Is that you? 
1 = Yes 
2 = No-> GET PERSON OR GET NAME AND CALL 
BACK. 
(Call back person) (Name) 
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We would like to discuss your perceptions and opinions related to the foods we eat. Before I do 
that, I want to assure you that any information you provide will be kept strictly confidential and 
used only for the purposes of this research. If you feel any question is too personal, you do not 
have to answer it. This will take 5-10 minutes of your time. 
I will begin by asking you a question about your eating habits. 
2a. Do you ever eat meat? This includes beef, pork, chicken, turkey, as well as wild game. 
1 = Yes 
2  =  No- GO TO Q.3. 
b. Do you eat... 
Yes No 
beef. 1 2 
poultry 1 2 
pork 1 2 
fish 1 2 
3a. Have you ever had food poisoning? 
1 = Yes b. How did you find out you had it? 
2 = No 
3 = MAYBE, THINK SO BUT UNSURE 
9 = DON'T KNOW 
4. From what you know about your immediate family, have any of them had food poisoning? 
1 = Yes 
2 = No 
3 = MAYBE, THINK SO BUT UNSURE 
9 = DON'T KNOW 
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5. How concerned are you about the safety of the food you buy? Would you say you are... 
1 = Not at all concerned 
2 = Slightly concerned 
3 = Somewhat concerned, or 
4 = Very concerned 
6. There are many procedures used in processing food to control bacteria and produce safer 
food. We would like to know how concerned you are about the safety of these procedures, 
Using a scale of 1 to 5, where "1" means that you are not concerned at all and "5" means 
that you are very concerned, tell me how concerned you are about each food processing 
method. How concerned are you about the safety of (method)? What number from "1" to 
"5" indicates how you feel about the safety of this process? 
Not 
at all Very 
Pasteurization 1 2 3 4 5 
Chemical treatments such as 
chlorination 1 2 3 4 5 
Canning 1 2 3 4 5 
Freezing 1 2 3 4 5 
Irradiation 1 2 3 4 5 
Fermentation, e.g. the process used to make 
cheese and yogurt 1 2 3 4 5 
Food preservatives 1 2 3 4 5 
PROBE - NO DEFINITIONS WILL BE GIVEN. IF RESPONDENT IS 
RELUCTANT AND FEELS UNINFORMED, SAY; "From what you know about the 
process, etc." IF THEY REFUSE TO ANSWER, NOTE AS "DK." 
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7. Next, I will ask you about certain foods. I would like to know which of the following you 
would consider safe or not safe for you to eat. Here's the first one (food"). Would you 
consider (it/them) safe or unsafe to eat? 
Safe Unsafe DON'T 
KNOW 
Meat from animals that have been given antibiotics at 
approved levels? 1 2 9 
Meat from animals that have been given hormones at 
approved levels? 1 2 9 
Foods that have been treated with irradiation? 1 2 9 
Meat that has nitrite? 1 2 9 
Foods made at home with raw eggs, such as homemade 
ice cream or mayonnaise? 1 2 9 
Eating raw beef? 1 2 9 
Meat that has been both cooked and refrigerated at 
the store? 1 2 9 
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8. Next, I would like to know how knowledgeable you are about a process used on food called 
irradiation. Would you say you... 
1 = never heard of food irradiation -» 
2 = have heard of it, but don't know much about it -• 
3 = know something about it 
4 = know a lot about it 
DO NOT DEFINE IRRADIATION. 
9. What do you think are the advantages, if any, of irradiating food? 
GO TO Q.ll. 
10. What do you think are the disadvantages, if any, of irradiating food? 
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11. Let me explain what the process does. The irradiation process is used to kill insects, 
parasites, and bacteria such as Salmonella and E.coli that can cause food borne illness and 
food spoilage. 
Again, using a scale of 1 to 5, where "I" means that you are not concerned and "5" means 
that you are very concerned, how concerned are you (concern')? What number from 1 to 5 
would you choose if 1 means not at all concerned and 5 means very concerned? 
Not 
at all Very 
that irradiated food coulc^ be radioactive. 2 3 4 5 
about whether levels of nutrients and vitamins 
may be reduced in irradiated food 2 3 4 5 
about whether irradiation causes environmental 
pollution 2 3 4 5 
about whether irradiation would increase the cost 
of food 2 3 4 5 
that irradiation could produce cancer causing 
substances 2 3 4 5 
about whether eating irradiated foods could cause 
birth defects 1 2 3 4 5 
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12. I am going to read a list of foods. Would you tell me how likely or unlikely it is that you 
would buy the food if it was treated with approved doses of radiation and properly labeled as 
irradiated. How likely is it that you would buy (food) that have been irradiated? Would you 
say it is very likely, somewhat likely, not too likely, or not at all likely? 
Very Somewhat Not too Not at all 
likely likely likely likely 
Fruits and vegetables 1 2 3 4 
Poultry products 1 2 3 4 
Pork products 1 2 3 4 
Beef products 1 2 3 4 
Seafood 1 2 3 4 
13. Raw meats may contain bacteria and parasites such as Salmonella, E.coli, and Trichinella, 
which can cause food-borne illness. Irradiation can kill these bacteria and parasites. 
Knowing this, how likely would you be to buy irradiated meat rather than non-irradiated 
meat. Are you... 
1 = Very likely 
2 = Somewhat likely 
3 = Not too likely 
4 = Not at all likely to buy irradiated meat? 
9 = DON'T KNOW 
Next, I will tell you more about the irradiation of pork for the control of the parasite, Trichinella, 
which causes a disease called Trichinosis. The symptoms of the disease are abdominal pains, 
vomiting, diarrhea, headaches, fever,and the chills. Each year, about 100 cases of Trichinosis are 
diagnosed in the United States, but the actual number of cases is probably much higher. Of the 
people who get Trichinosis, about 1 out of 100 will die. 
By using the irradiation process, which has been approved by the Food and Drug Administration, 
the risk of contracting trichinosis is almost eliminate. 
The process uses either gamma rays, x-rays, or electrons to kill organisms, like Trichinella. The 
level of radiation used to treat pork does not cause food to become radioactive. The Food and 
Drug Administration concluded that irradiation of pork does not present a health hazard and it 
does not affect the nutritional value of food. 
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14a. Knowing this, if you were offered a choice of two pork sandwiches - one which has 
been irradiated, reducing your chance of getting trichinosis to almost zero, and one that 
has not been irradiated, which gives you a 1 in 2.6 million chance of contracting 
Trichinosis, which would you choose? The irradiated pork or the nonirradiated pork? 
1 = Irradiated -» 
2 = Non-irradiated -*• 
3 = NO PREFERENCE, GO TO Q.c. 
GOTO 
Q.c. 
ASK Q.b. 
b. Let's imagine that you have a grilled pork sandwich which has been irradiated. This 
sandwich costs $2.00. How much more would you be willing to pay to get a sandwich 
which has not been irradiated? 
GO TO Q.15. 
c. Let's imagine that you have a grilled pork sandwich which has not been irradiated. 
This sandwich costs $2.00. How much more would you be willing to pay to get a 
sandwich which has been irradiated? 
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15. In this last part of the interview, I would like a bit of background information about you... 
DO NOT ASK; CODE SEX. 
1 = Male 
2 = Female 
16. How old were you on your last birthday? 
17. What is the highest level of education you have completed? Please include college, 
vocational or technical training. 
1 = Grade 8 
2 = 9 - 11 
3 = H.S. Grad., G.E.D. 
4 = Some technical, trade, business school 
5 = Some college, no degree 
6 = B.S., B.A. complete 
7 = Some graduate work, no degree 
8 = M.S., M.A., etc. 
12 = Ph.. D., D.D.S., M.D., etc. 
18. Are you currently employed... 
1 = full-time 
2 = part-time 
3 = unemployed. 
4 = retired, -* 
5 = disabled, -*• 
6 = a full-time student, or -• 
7 = a homemaker -» 
GO TO Q.20. 
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19. What is your occupation? [WHAT DO YOU MAKE OR DO?] 
20. In order to see if we are getting a cross section of all people, I would like to know your 
approximate household income for all people living there? Please include wages and 
salaries, business or farm income, social security or retirement income, alimony, child 
support, or any other sources of income. What was the household 1992 income, before 
taxes? Was it... 
01 = Less than $10,000 
02 = 10,000 up to 20,000 
03 = 20,000 up to 30,000 
04 = 30,000 up to 40,000 
05 = 40,000 up to 50,000 
06 = 50,000 up to 70,000 
07 = 70,000 up to 100,000 
08 = More than $100,000 
77 = Don't know 
99 = REFUSED 
21. Are you currently... 
1 = Married or living in a marriage like relationship 
2 = Divorced 
3 = Separated 
4 = Widowed or 
5 = Single and never married 
22. a. How many people live in your household, including yourself? 
people 
b. How many children are living there who are under 18? 
children 
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23.a. Approximately how much do you spend per week for your household on food? Would 
you say... 
1 = Less than $25 
2 = $26 - $50 
3 = $51 - $100 
4 = $101 - $150 
5 = $151 or more 
b. Approximately how much do you spend in an average week on meat, fish or poultry 
products? 
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24. Compared to other people your own age, would you say your physical health is... 
1 = Excellent 
2 = Good 
3 = Fair, or 
4 = Poor 
25. Before we close, I want to thank you for your help with our research. I would also like to 
offer you the chance to earn $30.00. We would like to have you come to Iowa State at a 
time which is convenient for you sometime in the next month. We will be conducting a 
consumer experiment on food preferences and food safety with people like yourself and it 
will take about 1 1/2 hours of your time. There is no risk to you in this experiment. For 
your participation, you will be paid $30.00. Would you be willing to do that? 
1 = Yes 
2 = No- DISCUSS ANY FEARS, ETC. 
IF NO, GO TO END. 
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May I please have your name and I would like to verify your address and telephone 
number. [RECORD BELOW.] 
26. We will submit your name to the researchers conducting the experiments and one of them 
will call you wiAin the next 2 weeks to schedule an appointment. Are days, evenings, or 
weekends best for you? 
1 = Days 
2 = Evenings 
3 = Weekends 
27. Which (days, evenings, weekends) are better? 
[END:] 
Thank you so much for all of your help with our study. The University is grateful for the 
time you have given us. Good night! 
a.m. 
END TIME: : 
p.m. 
COMMENTS: 
FOR OFFICE USE 
ID NAME: 
ADDRESS: 
TELEPHONE: 515 
Porkeater? 
Yes 
CITY 
0.14a. 14b 14c 
1= Irradiated NA $_. 
2=Nonirradiated $_. NA 
3=No preference NA 
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Appendix B 
Experimental Instructions 
General Instructions 
You are about to participate in an experiment about decision making. Please follow the 
instructions carefully. 
Specific Instructions 
You will receive $30 for participating in this experiment. Your take home income will consist 
of your initial income ($30) minus the value of goods purchased. 
The experiment has two stages. In stage 1 you will be asked to decide how much you would 
be willing to pay for different candy bars. In stage 2 you will be asked to decide how much 
you would be willing to pay for different meat products. 
You will submit your bidding price on a recording card. You cannot reveal your bids to any 
other participant. Any communication between bidders will result in an automatic penalty of 
$3. 
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CONSENT FORM 
You are about to participate in an experiment in willingness-to-pay for a food product. 
We need your signed consent if you are to act as a subject. Your participation in the 
experiment is completely voluntary and you may withdraw from the experiment at any time 
without prejudice to you. Results from the experiment will be strictly confidential. Any name 
associate with the experiment will be deleted upon completion of the experiment. 
If you consent to participate in the experiment, please sign the consent form below. 
I have read the consent form statement and agree to act as subject in the experiment, with the 
understanding that I can withdraw from the experiment at any time without prejudice to me. 
Signature 
l L 
Date 
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ABOUT YOU # 
1. Your sex: Male Female 
2. Your age: 19 or under 
20-24 
25-29 
30-34 
35-39 
40-44 
45-49 
50 or over 
3. How many individuals live in your household, including yourself? 
If you have children, how old are they? 
4. Do you eat red meat? Yes No 
Do you eat poultry? Yes No 
Do you eat fish? Yes No 
5. How often do you eat red meat, poultry, fish? 
Number of times you eat red meat per week? 
Number of times you eat poultry per week? 
Number of times you eat fish per week? 
6. Have you ever had food poisoning? 
Yes No Don't know 
7. If you became sick with a food-borne disease, how much money would you lose per day in 
addition to medical costs (i.e., lost wages)? 
dollars per day 
8. How healthy do you consider your diet? 
Could be a lot Could be somewhat Is healthy Is healthy as it Not sure 
healthier healthier enough could possibly be 
1 2 3 4 5 
9. Are you currently on a diet? Yes No 
Explain 
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10. Over the past year, what are you eating more, less or the same amount of to ensure a healthy 
diet? 
Vegetables/Fruits More Less Same 
Red Meats More Less Same 
Poultry More Less Same 
Fish More Less Same 
Sugar More Less Same 
Fiber More Less Same 
Salt More Less Same 
Dairy Products More Less Same 
Calories More Less Same 
Starch/Potatoes/Pasta More Less Same 
Organic foods More Less Same 
Vit./Min. Supplements More Less Same 
11. On a scale of 1 to 5 with 1 being 'not concerned' and 5 being 'very concerned', indicate how 
you feel about the following nutritional characteristics of food. 
Item Not Concerned Very Concerned 
Fat content 1 2 3 4 5 
Cholesterol levels 1 2 3 4 5 
Salt content 1 2 3 4 5 
Calories 1 2 3 4 5 
Sugar content 1 2 3 4 5 
Vit./Min. content 1 2 3 4 5 
Preservatives 1 2 3 4 5 
Fiber content 1 2 3 4 5 
Chemical additives 1 2 3 4 5 
Freshness 1 2 3 4 5 
Less red meat 1 2 3 4 5 
Artificial sweetener 1 2 3 4 5 
Processed foods 1 2 3 4 5 
Less frying 1 2 3 4 5 
Junk food 1 2 3 4 5 
Protein value 1 2 3 4 5 
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12. On a scale of 1 to 5 with 1 being 'not at all hazardous' and 5 being 'very serious hazard', 
rank the hazard level of each of the following. 
Not at all Very Serious 
Item Hazardous Hazard 
Fats 1 2 3 4 5 
Cholesterol 1 2 3 4 5 
Salt 1 2 3 4 5 
Sugar 1 2 3 4 5 
13. On a scale of 1 to 5 with 1 being 'not at all serious' and 5 being 'very serious', rank how you 
feel each of the following affects food safety. 
Not at all Very 
serious Serious 
Item 
Spoilage 2 3 4 5 
Pesticides & Herbicides 2 3 4 5 
Chemicals 2 3 4 5 
Add itives/preservatives 2 3 4 5 
Pollution 2 3 4 5 
Bacteria/salmonella 2 3 4 5 
Bugs/pests/rats 2 3 4 5 
Antibiotics 2 3 4 5 
Irradiation of food 2 3 4 5 
Animal growth enhancers 2 3 4 5 
Genetic engineering/biotechnology 2 3 4 5 
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14. On a scale of 1 to 5 with 1 being 'not concerned' and 5 being 'very concerned', rank how you 
feel regarding the following issues in production agriculture. 
Not Very 
Item concerned concerned 
Crop Production 
Soil erosion/tillage 1 2 3 4 5 
Pesticides/herbicides 1 2 3 4 5 
Genetic engineering/biotech 1 2 3 4 5 
Livestock Production 
Confinement systems 1 2 3 4 5 
Animal welfare 1 2 3 4 5 
Antibiotics 1 2 3 4 5 
Growth enhancers 1 2 3 4 5 
Genetic engineering/biotech 1 2 3 4 5 
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Instructions for Stage 1 
1. You own the candy bar in front of you. 
2. Let's say you are willing to pay $x for your candy bar and $y for a different candy bar. The 
difference ($y - $x) is what you are willing to pay to exchange your candy bar for the other 
candy bar. ff you do not wish to exchange your candy bar for the other candy bar, a zero 
willingness to pay is appropriate. 
You will be asked to indicate your willingness to pay to trade your candy bar for the other 
candy bar. Do not state what you would pay for the entire other candy bar. Only state the 
difference ($y - $x) you are willing to pay. 
3. When the experiment begins we will ask you to write your bid for the other candy bar on the 
recording card. We will collect your bids and display the I.D. numbers of the winning 
bidders and the price they will pay for the other candy bar on the blackboard. 
4. There will be five rounds of bidding (trials). However, only one trial will be binding. After 
the five trials, a number will be randomly selected to determine which trial is binding. The 
highest bidders in that trial will exchange their candy bars for the other candy bar and must 
pay the displayed price (which will be the highest rejected bid in that trial). 
In each round of bidding the number of "different" candy bars to be sold will be determined 
by a random drawing. For example, in Trial 1 we may sell 3 of the other candy bars. In that 
case the three highest bidders in Trial 1 will trade candy bars and will pay an amount equal 
to the ^ highest bid in that trial. 
Note: Ties will be decided by a coin toss. 
Note: In this auction it is in your best interest to bid the amount that you are truly willing to pay to 
change one candy bar for the other. If you bid more than your true willingness-to-pay you 
increase your chances of purchasing the other candy bar but you may have to pay a price that 
is greater than what you are willing to pay. On the other hand, if you bid less than the 
amount that you are truly willing to pay Aen you may lose the chance to purchase the other 
candy bar at a price that you would be willing to pay. 
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Questions for Stage 1 # 
Please answer the following questions, which are designed to help you understand stage 1. Do not 
hesitate to ask the researchers if you have questions. 
1. Suppose that person A is the highest bidder in the first trial, person B is the highest bidder 
in the third trial, and person C is the highest bidder in the fifth trial. If, after five trials are 
finished, and if only 1 candy bar was available to be sold in each trial, we randomly select 
the third trial, then who will trade their candy bar for the other candy bar? 
2. If $a is the highest bid in the third trial, and the second highest bid is $b, what price would 
be paid for the other candy bar? $ 
3. If your bid is not the highest in the third trial, which is randomly selected, how much will you 
pay for the other candy bar? $ 
4. Suppose there were 2 candy bars available to be sold in the third trial, and the third trial was 
binding. If person B was the highest bidder, person D was the 2nd highest bidder, and person 
E was the third highest bidder, who would trade their candy bar for the other type of candy 
bar? 
5. In question 4, how much would the high bidders pay for the other candy bar? The answer 
is: the amount that person bid. 
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Questions for Stage 2 # 
1. There are ten bidding trials. Suppose person A is the highest bidder in the second trial, 
person B is the 2nd highest bidder, and person C is the 3rd highest bidder and the second trial 
is selected to be the binding trial. If only 1 Type II sandwich were available to be sold in the 
second trial, then who will buy that Type II sandwich? 
2. If there were 2 Type II sandwiches available in the second trial, then who will buy that Type 
II sandwich? 
3. If there were 2 Type II sandwiches available in the second trial, then what price would be 
paid? The answer is: the amount that person bid. 
Please answer the following questions. 
1. Have you ever heard of the food borne pathogen Trichinella ? yes no 
2. How many people do you think become ill from Trichinella in the United States over one 
year? 
Answer: out of 1 thousand people 
3. What foods do you think are the important sources of Trichinella in the United States? 
Please list the type of food items. 
4. Have you ever heard of or read about irradiation for food products ? 
yes 
no 
5. Where have you heard or read about irradiation ? 
6. How would you characterize your attitude towards food irradiation ? 
positive 
negative 
neutral 
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Instructions for Stage 2 
Step 1. There are two types of pork 
Type I 
The features of each are described below. 
Type II 
This pork meat has a typical chance of 
being contaminated with Trichinella. If 
you eat this meat there is about a 1 in 2.6 
million chance of contracting Trichinosis. 
This pork meat has been treated by 
irradiation to control Trichinella. 
Because of this treatment we can 
guarantee that this meat will not cause 
Trichinosis. 
Step 2. You own a grilled pork sandwich made from the Type I pork meat. Everyone has 
the same Type I meat. 
Step 3. Let's say you are willing to pay $y for the Type I meat and $z for the Type II meat. 
The difference ($z - $y) is what you are willing to pay to exchange Type I for Type 
II. Please indicate your willingness to pay to exchange your Type I meat for the 
Type II meat. Only state the difference ($z - $y) that you are willing to pay. If you 
do not wish to exchange your Type I meat for the Type II meat, then a bid of zero 
is appropriate. 
Step 4. There will be ten trials. After all ten trials are complete, we will randomly select one 
binding trial to determine who buys the Type II meat. 
As in the candy bar auction, the number of Type II sandwiches available for sale in 
a particular trial will be determined by a random drawing. The price will be the 
amount of the highest rejected bid. 
Note: The meat will have to be consumed to leave with the take-home income. This applies to all 
participants, not just the winning bidders. 
Note: In this auction it is in your best interest to bid the amount that you are truly willing to pay to 
change one sandwich for the otiier. If you bid more than your true willingness-to-pay you 
increase your chances of purchasing the other sandwich but you may have to pay a price that 
is greater than what you are willing to pay. On the other hand, if you bid less than the 
amount that you are truly willing to pay then you may lose the chance to purchase the other 
sandwich at a price that you would be willing to pay. 
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Trichinella 
Pork products can be irradiated for the control of a parasite, Trichinella, which causes a disease 
called Trichinosis. The symptoms of the disease are abdominal pains, vomiting, diarrhea, headaches, 
fever, and the chills. Each year, about 100 cases of Trichinosis are diagnosed in the United States, 
but the actual number of cases is probably much higher. Of the people who get Trichinosis, about 
1 out of 100 will die. 
By using the irradiation process, which has been approved by the Food and Drug Administration, the 
risk of contracting trichinosis is almost eliminated. 
The process uses either gamma rays, x-rays, or electrons to kill organisms like Trichinella. The level 
of irradiation used to treat pork does not cause food to become radioactive. The Food and Drug 
Administration concluded that irradiation of pork does not present a health hazard and it does not 
affect the nutritional value of food. 
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Information for Trials 6-10 
Type I Type II 
This pork meat has a typical chance of 
being contaminated with Trichinella. If 
you eat this meat there is about a 1 in 2.6 
million chance of contracting Trichinosis. 
This pork meat has been treated by 
irradiation to control Trichinella. 
Because of this treatment we can 
guarantee that this meat will not cause 
Trichinosis. 
Irradiation of Pork Products: 
The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has recently approved the use of ionizing radiation 
to control Trichinella in pork products. Based on it's evaluation of several toxicity studies, the FDA 
concluded that the irradiation of pork products at approved levels did not present a toxicological 
hazard to consumers nor did it adversely effect the nutritional value of the product. 
Irradiation of pork products at approved levels results in a 10,000 fold reduction in the viability of 
Trichinella organisms present in the meat. 
Description of Irradiation: 
The forms of ionizing energy used in food processing include gamma rays, x-rays, and accelerated 
electrons. Ionizing energy works by breaking chemical bonds in organic molecules. When a 
sulficient number of critical bonds are split in the bacteria and otiier pests in food, the organisms are 
The energy levels of the gamma rays, accelerated electrons, and x-rays legally permitted for 
processing food do not induce measurable radioactivity. 
Description of Trichinosis: 
The symptoms of Trichinosis during the pathogen's intestinal maturation phase are abdominal pains, 
nausea, vomiting, and diarrhea. During muscular migration there is edema of the upper eyelids, 
headaches, fever, sweating and chills. 
Of those individuals who get sick, about 1 individual out of 100 will die annually. 
killed. 
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Please take the time to answer the following questions before you leave. # 
Please record any comments you may have regarding the experiment. For example, did you 
fmd it interesting or boring, was the auction too complicated, was it explained well, etc. 
2. If you changed your bid at any stage during the auction, could you briefly explain how and 
why you changed your bid. 
Having completed the experiment, how would you characterize your attitude to food 
irradiation. 
positive 
negative 
neutral 
If your attitude to food irradiation changed, what was the reason for the change. 
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AGREEMENT OF UNDERSTANDING FORM 
The risks you took in eating this food are identical to those you take when eating meals you 
prepare at home or purchase when eating out. 
Please sign below to indicate that you have read and understood the above announcement. 
Signature 
l L 
Date 
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CHAPTER 3. EFFECTS OF ALTERNATIVE DESCRIPTIONS OF FOOD 
IRRADIATION ON PREFERENCES FOR IRRADIATED PORK IN 
EXPERIMENTAL AUCTIONS* 
A paper to be submitted to the American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics 
John A. Fox, Jason F. Shogren, Dermot J. Hayes, 
and James B. Kliebenstein" 
Abstract 
Using a non-hypothetical laboratory experimental auction we examine the effects of 
alternative descriptions of the food irradiation process on willingness to pay to upgrade 
from a typical pork sandwich to one irradiated for control of Trichinella. We find that a 
positively biased description of food irradiation increases willingness to pay, a negatively 
biased description decreases willingness to pay, and when combined the negative 
description dominates the positive description resulting in lower willingness to pay. 
* Journal Paper No. J- of the Iowa Agriculture and Home Economics Experiment Station, Ames, Iowa. 
Project No.2994. The fmancial support of the Food Safety Consortium is acknowledged. We thank Bruce 
Babcock and Dennis Olson for helpful comments. 
** Fox - assistant professor. Department of Agricultural Economics, Kansas State University, Manhattan, KS 
66502; Shogren and Hayes - associate professors, Kliebenstein - professor. Department of Economics, Iowa 
State University, Ames, lA 50011. Fox was a graduate assistant at Iowa State University when this research 
was completed. 
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Introduction 
Contingent valuation studies have shown that differences in the level and type of 
information provided to respondents will affect willingness to pay (WTP) values for a 
good. For example, Samples et al. (1986) found that changes in the descriptions of three 
endangered species had a significant effect on the division of respondents' fixed 
hypothetical allocations among the three species. Hoevenagel and van der Linden (1993) 
found that providing extra information on an ecological good - a clean environment - had 
a significant effect on WTP values. Bergstrom et al. (1990) found that providing extra 
information on wetlands had a significant effect on willingness to pay values. Boyle 
(1989) found that while additional information about a trout fishery did not affect mean 
values, it did reduce the variance of values significantly. 
To date, all of these studies have been based on hypothetical surveys. To the best 
of our knowledge this paper is the first to measure these effects under non-hypothetical 
conditions. We use a randomly selected sample of adult subjects in a laboratory 
experimental auction. The objective is to investigate the effects of alternative 
descriptions of food irradiation on willingness to pay to upgrade from a typical pork 
sandwich to one irradiated for control of Trichinella. 
Our study is not an investigation of framing effects in the sense defined by 
Cummings, Brookshire, and Schulze (1986). The descriptions of the irradiation process 
that we use were chosen to reflect polar attitudes to food irradiation - one for and one 
against. The favorable description emphasizes the safety and benefits of the process. 
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while the unfavorable description emphasizes the potential risks. Both are based on 
literature currently available to the public. What we are interested in learning is whether, 
and to what extent consumers' perceptions of the benefits of food irradiation are 
susceptible to negative messages from groups opposed to the process. Given recent 
approvals of irradiation for pork and poultry products, this issue is currently germane to 
food safety policy. 
The Setting 
Most scientists agree that food products properly treated by irradiation are safe, but 
some consumer groups such as Food and Water, Inc., are actively campaigning to halt 
adoption of the food irradiation process. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has 
approved irradiation for a number of food products including pork and poultry for control 
of Trichinella and Salmonella, but irradiated food products are not yet widely available; 
to date they are sold only at three locations in Florida, and one in Illinois, and there is 
only one commercial food irradiation facility in operation. 
There have been a number of studies on consumer attitude to food irradiation. 
Schutz et a/.(1989) and Malone Jr.(1990) found that 45 percent and 36 percent of 
respondents in national surveys indicated a willingness to purchase irradiated food. A 
survey conducted for the American Meat Institute (1993) found that 60 percent of 
participants said they would be willing to pay 10 cents more for irradiated hamburger if 
irradiation reduced bacteria levels. In an experimental setting, Fox et al. (1993) found 
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that when consumers were provided with a neutral, scientific description of the facts 
concerning food irradiation, 90 percent preferred the irradiated product. Market tests for 
irradiated papayas (Bruhn and Noell), irradiated mangoes (Giddings), and irradiated 
strawberries (Marcotte) have been successful. Other studies have shown that attitudes to 
irradiation can be positively influenced with additional information (Bruhn et aL, Terry 
and Tabor) 
For the most part, surveys on acceptability have been conducted in a sheltered 
informational setting in that none incorporated negative statements such as those used by 
Food and Water,Inc. Of the market tests, only that for strawberries involved the 
presence of anti-irradiation activists. It comes as no surprise then that food processors 
have not rushed to adopt food irradiation. In fact, Food and Water,Inc. has convinced 
many major food companies, under threat of consumer boycott, not to use the irradiation 
process, and has successfully lobbied to defeat proposed irradiation facilities in Hawaii 
and Alaska. The activities of, and publicity given to, these pressure groups thus 
constitutes a major barrier to widescale adoption of food irradiation. 
Our objective in this paper is to investigate how consumers respond to information 
about food irradiation. We are particularly interested in the way consumers respond to 
the mutually contradictory descriptions that often appear in media sources. 
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Methods 
The study covered six groups of adult subjects recruited from a random sample of 
names purchased from a commercial survey company. One hundred and ninety nine 
introductory letters (Appendix A) were mailed and telephone contact was subsequently 
made with 125 potential participants. Of the 125, 78 indicated that they would be willing 
to participate in an experimental session lasting not more than two hours in return for a 
payment of $40.00. No information regarding the nature of the study was given - it was 
described only as a consumer economics experiment. Sessions were scheduled for 8.30 
am, 10.45 am, and 1.00 pm on Saturday 7 May, and Saturday 21 May, 1994. Of the 78 
subjects willing to participate, 59 indicated that they could attend on those dates. Ten 
subjects were allocated to each of five sessions, with nine subjects allocated to the sixth. 
Actual participation was nine subjects in four sessions, ten in one, and seven in another. 
Participants were the primary food shoppers of their households. 
Each of the six experiments consisted of two stages (See Appendix B for 
experimental instructions). Initially, subjects were given a number for identification, 
asked to complete a questionnaire dealing with food and nutritional issues and 
demographics, and were paid the $40.00 participation fee. In Stage 1 of each experiment 
subjects were provided with a candy bar (Brand X) and informed that a different candy 
bar (Brand Y) would be auctioned. The purpose of this stage was to teach the 
participants how the auction process worked. Five rounds of bidding (trials) were 
conducted, each with equal probability of being binding. The I.D. number of the highest 
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bidder and the amount of the second highest, mean, and lowest bid were revealed 
following each trial. At the end of Stage 1, a number was drawn to determine which 
round would be binding. The highest bidder in that round then exchanged his/her Brand 
X candy bar for the Brand Y candy bar and paid the market price which was the second 
highest bid in that round. 
Prior to Stage 2, participants were asked to indicate whether or not they had heard 
of Trichinella and food irradiation. They were also asked to characterize their attitude to 
food irradiation as positive, negative, or neutral. Participants then received the following 
descriptions of two pork sandwiches: 
Type I: This is a typical pork sandwich. The pork in this sandwich has a 
typical chance of being contaminated with Trichinella. 
Type II: The pork in this sandwich has been treated by irradiation to control 
Trichinella. Because of this treatment we can guarantee that this 
pork will not cause Trichinosis. 
Subjects were asked to record their subjective assessments of the risk of contracting 
Trichinosis from the typical (Type I) sandwich by answering the question; 
If 1 million people ate the typical sandwich, how many do you think would become 
ill from Trichinosis? 
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They were also asked to indicate whether they considered the irradiated (Type II) 
sandwich to be much safer, somewhat safer, about as safe as, somewhat less safe than, or 
much less safe than the typical pork sandwich. 
Next, participants were informed that they had been endowed with a typical pork 
sandwich (Type I), and that a Type II (irradiated) pork sandwich would be auctioned. 
They were informed that, in order to complete the experiment and leave with their take 
home income, they would have to consume either a typical or an irradiated pork 
sandwich. They were then provided with a neutral description of the food irradiation 
process. This description informed them that irradiation of pork had been approved by 
the U.S. Food and Drug Administration for control of Trichinella, and that the process 
did not cause food to become radioactive. The information also described the forms of 
ionizing energy used in the process. In addition, participants received a description of 
the symptoms of trichinosis and were informed that the objective odds of contracting 
trichinosis from the Type I sandwich were approximately 1 in 2.628.000. The 
comparative safety question was then repeated to determine the effect of this information 
on perceptions about the irradiated sandwich. Five rounds of bidding (trials) were then 
conducted, with the 2nd high, mean, and lowest bid revealed following each trial. 
The comparative safety question was repeated a third time following trial 3. There 
were two reasons for repeating this question. First, we wanted to see whether the 
information we revealed about the distribution of bids had an effect on subjects' 
assessment of the irradiated sandwich. Second, the answer to this question would serve 
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as a consistency check on participants' understanding of the auction, i.e. it would be 
inconsistent for a participant to rank the irradiated sandwich less safe and yet bid a 
positive amount to upgrade to it. 
After the fifth trial, additional information was provided. Groups 1 and 2, which 
comprise Treatment A, received a positive description of the irradiation process based on 
information provided by the American Council on Science and Health. This informed 
participants; of the proven effectiveness and safety of food irradiation, that it leaves no 
residue, that it had been approved by the American Medical Association and the World 
Health Organization, that it was currently used in over 20 countries, and that it could 
help prevent many of the more than 9,000 deaths from food-borne illness that occur each 
year in the United States. 
Groups 3 and 4, comprising Treatment B, received a negative description of 
irradiation based on information from Food and Water, Inc. This informed participants 
that irradiation produced known carcinogens called radiolytic products in food, that it 
resulted in lower levels of essential vitamins, that irradiation was unnecessary since 
proper cooking killed all pathogens in food, that it would eliminate warning signs of the 
botulin toxin, that food irradiation was linked to the U.S. nuclear weapons and nuclear 
power industries, and that it necessitated the transportation of radioactive materials which 
posed dangers for plant workers and nearby communities. Groups 5 and 6, comprising 
Treatment C, received both the positive and negative descriptions of irradiation following 
trial 5. 
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After participants had read the new information, the question on relative safety was 
given for a fourth time. Bidding recommenced for trials 6 to 10, with relative safety 
assessed for the final time following trial 8. After 10 trials, a number was drawn to 
determine who would purchase the Type II sandwich. Before subjects received their 
sandwiches, they were asked to complete a short exit survey on their bidding behavior. 
They were also asked to estimate the risk of trichinosis from the typical sandwich, even 
though this information had been given to them during the experiment and was still in 
their possession. Finally, they were asked again to characterize their attitude to food 
irradiation as positive, negative, or neutral. Participants then consumed their sandwiches 
with the winner consuming the Type II sandwich. Before leaving participants had the 
option of participating in a short guided tour of the food irradiation facility during which 
any questions about the process were addressed. 
Results and Discussion 
Bidding Patterns 
Figure 1 shows the behavior of the mean bids in each of the three treatments.' 
Some conclusions are immediately apparent. The positive description of food irradiation 
provided following trial 5 caused the average bid to increase in Treatment A. Following 
trial 6, the average bid continued to increase until trial 10. Four participants in group 1, 
and two participants in group 2 bid zero prior to information (Table 1). The zero bid 
' Groups 1 and 2 in Treatment A had nine participants each. Groups 3 and 4 in Treatment B had ten and 
nine participants. Groups 5 and 6 in Treatment C had nine and seven participants. 
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indicated indifference or a potential preference for the typical non-irradiated sandwich. 
Following information, the number of zero bidders fell to two and zero. 
In Treatment B, the negative description of irradiation caused bids in groups 3 and 
4 to decrease between trials 5 and 6. Following trial 6, the average bid for irradiated 
pork remained stable in both groups, and was lower than in any of the trials prior to the 
negative description. The number bidding zero increased from six to nine following the 
negative description of irradiation. In group 4, with nine participants, the number 
bidding zero increased from five to eight. 
Treatment C shows the effect of providing simultaneously both the positive and 
negative descriptions of irradiation. The average bid decreased following trial 5. In 
group 5, the average bid tended upward over the first five trials indicating that some 
participants were submitting successively larger bids to obtain the preferred irradiated 
pork. Following trial 5, the upward trend was reversed, and over trials 6 through 10 the 
average bid for irradiated pork steadily decreased. Seven of the nine participants in 
group 5 bid a positive amount for irradiated pork in trial 5. All seven reduced their bid 
between trials 5 and 6, but only one participant reduced his/her bid to zero. One 
participant raised his /her bid between trials 5 and 6 - from zero to $0.10. Because all 
bids for irradiated pork fell, we concluded that the negative information had a stronger 
impact than the positive information. Unlike Treatment B, a majority of participants (six 
of nine) continued to bid for the irradiated pork suggesting that the positive description 
helped to preserve their preference for the irradiated product. 
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In group 6 the average bid was similar to that of group 5 in the first round of 
bidding, but steadily decreased over the first five trials, a pattern not observed in the 
other groups. In fact, only two of the seven participants in group 6 consistently bid for 
irradiated pork over the first five trials. Following provision of the positive and negative 
descriptions of irradiation, the downward trend continued. At the end of the experiment, 
all of the seven participants submitted zero bids. 
Risk and Relative Safety Assessments 
Prior to receiving objective odds of contracting trichinosis, 39 of 53 participants 
(74%) judged the irradiated pork sandwich to be safer than the typical pork sandwich 
(Table 2). Even though a majority of participants overestimated the risk of trichinosis 
(Figure 2), more participants (43 or 81%) judged the irradiated sandwich to be safer after 
receiving the objective odds (see Assessment #2 in Table 2). Between the 2nd and 3rd 
assessments, eight subjects lowered their relative safety assessments for the irradiated 
pork by one category. The different types of information presented following trial 5 
caused a total of 33 participants to change their assessments (Table 3). In Treatment A 
(positive information), nine of 18 participants raised their safety assessment by 1 
category. In Treatment B (negative information), 15 of 19 participants lowered their 
safety assessment - two participants lowered their assessment by the maximum of four 
categories (far safer to far less safe). In Treatment C (positive and negative information), 
nine of 16 reduced their assessments - none increased. These results are consistent with 
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the increase in bidding in Treatment A, and the reductions in the other two treatments. 
Following information, 16 of 18 participants in Treatment A ranked the irradiated 
sandwich safer - in Treatments B and C, one of 19 and five of 16 ranked irradiated safer. 
We cross checked relative safety assessments with previous and subsequent bids to 
check for consistency. We found that for four subjects, one in Treatment B and three in 
Treatment C, positive bids were submitted to upgrade to irradiated pork while at the 
same time it was assessed as somewhat less safe than typical pork. Furthermore, two of 
the three in Treatment C recorded a negative attitude toward irradiation at the end of the 
experiment. We considered that these two subjects either did not understand the 
objective of the auction or were bidding simply out of curiosity and that their bid did not 
represent true willingness to pay. We exclude these two subjects from the analyses that 
follow. 
Figure 2 indicates that a majority of participants at the conclusion of the 
experiment recorded risk assessments for trichinosis consistent with the information they 
received. Three subjects reported posterior risk estimates of greater than one thousand 
cases of trichinosis per million Type 1 sandwiches. This suggests that either they did not 
understand the question or did not read or believe the information given them. The 
distribution of prior risk assessments shows a peak at 100 cases per million. Nine 
subjects (17%) were accurate, recording risk of less than one case per million 
sandwiches, while an additional nine recorded risk between one and 10 cases per million 
- the objective odds are less than 0.5 per million. 
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Awareness and Attitude to Irradiation 
Forty-one of 53 participants (77%) indicated that they had heard of food 
irradiation. This figure corresponds closely with the American Meat Institute survey 
reporting that 73 percent of respondents had heard of irradiation. Knowledge of food 
irradiation is increasing - Malone Jr.(1990) reported that 25% of participants in a 1987 
survey had heard of irradiation while for Schutz et a/. (1989) the figure was 60 percent. 
The number having heard of irradiation was fairly consistent across our treatments - 16 of 
18 in Treatment A, 14 of 19 in Treatment B, and 11 of 16 in Treatment C. Of the 41 
who were aware of food irradiation, 5 indicated a negative attitude toward it, 10 a 
positive attitude and the remainder were neutral. Of the 12 participants unaware of 
irradiation, one indicated a negative attitude and the remainder were neutral. 
Participation in the experiments brought about considerable changes in attitude to 
irradiation. In Treatment A, eight of 18 participants recorded a more favorable attitude 
at the end of the experiment than at the beginning. In Treatment B (negative information 
only), eight of 19 recorded a less favorable attitude and one a more favorable attitude. 
The person who indicated the improved attitude was consistently the highest bidder in his 
group and indicated that he discounted the negative description when he read that it came 
from a consumer advocacy group. In Treatment C, six of 16 recorded a less favorable 
attitude and three a more favorable attitude at the end of the experiment. 
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Regression Analysis 
We conducted separate analyses - one before information and one after information 
- to test whether differences in participant characteristics could account for differences in 
willingness to pay between the groups. To eliminate the effect of arbitrary fluctuations in 
the bids of participants who did not lock in a fixed bid, we use as dependent variables the 
averages over two three-trial intervals. Prior to information we use each participants' 
average bid over trials three to five, and following information we use the average bid 
over trials eight to ten. We eliminated from the analysis the bids of two participants who 
showed inconsistencies between bids, relative safety assessments, and attitude to 
irradiation. 
With a large proportion of bids at zero, ordinary least squares is not appropriate 
because it does not account for the qualitative difference between a positive bid 
(indicating preference for irradiated pork) and a zero bid (indicating indifference or 
potential preference for the typical pork). This qualitative choice is the issue of primary 
interest. We want to know whether the negative description causes preferences to shift 
away from irradiated pork, and if so to what extent can pro-irradiation messages prevent 
that shift. The appropriate tool to analyze this choice is probit analysis. Probit assumes 
that the observed dichotomous dependent variable indicates the sign of a latent continuous 
variable, i.e. 
Y; = XP + 6, 
where 
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Y , = 0  i f  y ; ^ 0 ;  Y ^  =  l  i f  Y ; > 0  
When Yi=l, there is a positive bid for irradiated pork; when Yi=0 the bid is zero. 
Based on previous research (Bruhn et al., Malone Jr.) we selected gender and age 
as potential explanatory variables. We also hypothesized that concern for food safety and 
initial assessments of trichinosis risk would affect the choice between the irradiated and 
non-irradiated pork. The results of probit analysis are presented in Table 5. The low 
number of observations is reflected in the scarcity of significant t-statistics but the models 
perform well in classifying zero and positive bids with correct prediction rates of 73 and 
80 percent. For pre-information bids, increasing concern for food safety has a positive 
and significant effect on the probability of bidding for the irradiated sandwich. The 
negative coefficient on sex indicates that males were less likely to bid but the effect was 
not significant. Treatment effects were not significant. 
The analysis of post-information bids clearly indicates the effects of the alternative 
descriptions of irradiation. Following information participants in Treatment A are 
significantly more likely to bid for irradiated pork than those in Treatments B and C. 
The difference between treatment B and the baseline treatment (C) is not significant - in 
fact the difference is somewhat less post-information than pre-information. This suggests 
that there was little difference between presenting groups with negative information or 
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with both positive and negative information - i.e. the effect of negative information 
dominated that of positive information in Treatment C. 
Why does negative information dominate? 
The negative description may dominate simply because it conveys the impression 
that the probability of illness from the irradiated pork is greater than that from the typical 
pork regardless of what is stated in the positive description. However, the concept of 
loss aversion, as described by Tversky and Kahneman (1991) offers an alternative 
explanation for the dominance of the negative description. 
Loss aversion implies that from a given reference point (the typical sandwich), 
losses (outcomes below the reference point) loom larger than corresponding gains 
(outcomes above the reference point). In other words, increases in the probability of 
illness (losses) have a greater impact on value than do corresponding decreases in the 
probability of illness (gains). Figure 3 illustrates the concept in the context of this 
experiment. The probability of illness and value associated with the Type I (typical) pork 
sandwich are represented by the origin. 
Positive information about irradiation informs participants of the reduced 
probability of contracting trichinosis and reassures them that irradiation is safe, i.e. there 
are no other risks. Given positive information, point a represents the reduced probability 
of illness associated with the irradiated sandwich, and a' represents the associated value. 
Negative information creates the opposite impression. It minimizes the potential 
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reduction in trichinosis risk from irradiated pork by stating that proper cooking also kills 
these pathogens, while at the same time it introduces the risk of cancer from irradiated 
food. Thus points b and b' represent the increased probability of illness and associated 
value for the irradiated pork given the negative description. 
Figure 3 depicts a situation where the increases and decreases in probability of 
illness associated with the positive and negative descriptions are of equal magnitude. 
With loss aversion, the impact on value of the negative description exceeds that of the 
positive description. Thus, when both descriptions are offered at the same time, the 
negative description has the greater impact on value, and there is a bias in favor of the 
status quo represented by the typical sandwich. 
Conclusions 
The bidding patterns and statistical analysis suggest that the effect of negative 
information about irradiation had a stronger impact on participants' perception of 
irradiation than did the positive description. Seventeen of 35 participants who received 
the negative description of irradiation had previously submitted a positive bid for 
irradiated pork. After receiving the negative description, all 17 participants immediately 
reduced their bids. Of the 17, eight reduced their bid to zero, but six of these zero bids 
occurred when participants did not simultaneously receive the positive description. This 
suggests that the positive description may have helped maintain the preference for 
irradiated pork among a number of participants who received negative information. 
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These results demonstrate the ability of the anti-irradiation lobby to influence 
consumer perceptions and thus have strong implications for the effort to promote food 
irradiation. Lx»ss aversion implies that to succeed in turning consumers against food 
irradiation, the anti-irradiation lobby need not convince them that the risks with irradiated 
food are greater than with non-irradiated food, but only that there are risks. The 
dominance of negative information suggests that aggressive promotion of the irradiation 
concept may not by itself be successful. What may also be required are regulations 
similar to those requiring truth-in-advertising which would restrict the anti-irradiation 
lobby from disseminating misleading information. 
Comments provided in the exit survey offer clues to what elements of the messages 
from both sides had the greatest impact. Among the reasons given for lowering the bid 
for irradiated pork, the most commonly cited was the perception of increased cancer risk 
from the irradiated sandwich (15 cites). Other important factors were environmental 
concerns (9 cites), loss of botulism warning signs (8 cites), and the use of radiation (7 
cites). The factor most often cited as a reason for increasing the bid for irradiated pork 
was reduced risk of illness or death. This was usually mentioned in association with a 
realization of the scope of the food safety problem - few people seem aware of the 
numbers who die from food poisoning each year (see Hayes et al. 1994). This suggests 
that promoters of food irradiation should try to increase awareness of the magnitude of 
food safety problems and show how food-irradiation can safely and effectively reduce 
food safety risk. 
90 
References 
American Meat Institute Foundation. "Consumer Awareness, Knowledge, and Acceptance 
of Food Irradiation." Arlington, Virginia. November 1993. 
Bennett, J. V., S. D. Holmberg, M. F. Rogers, and S. L. Solomon. "Infectious and 
Parasitic Diseases." in Closing the Gap: The Burden of Unnecessary Illness, ed. 
R. W. Amler and H. B. Hull. New York,NY. Oxford University Press. 1987. 
102-114. 
Bergstrom, J. C., J. R. Stoll, and A. Randall. "The Impact of Information on 
Environmental Commodity Valuation Decisions." American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 72(1990): 614-621. 
Boyle, K. J. "Commodity Specification and the Framing of Contingent Valuation 
Questions." Land Economics 65(1989);57-63. 
Bruhn, C. M., and J. W. Noell. "Consumer In-Store Response to Irradiated Papayas." 
Food Technology 41(1987):83-85. 
Bruhn C. M, H. G. Schutz, and R. Sommer. "Attitude Change Toward Food Irradiation 
Among Conventional and Alternative Consumers." Food Technology 
40(1986):86-91. 
Buhr, B. L., D. J. Hayes, J. F. Shogren, and J. B. Kliebenstein. "Valuing Ambiguity: 
The Case of Genetically Engineered Growth Enhancers." Journal of Agricultural 
and Resource Economics 18(1993): 175-184. 
Coursey, D. L. "Markets and the Measurement of Value." Public Choice 55(1987):291-
297. 
Cummings R. G., D. S. Brookshire, and W. D. Schulze. Valuing Environmental Goods: 
An Assessment of the Contingent Valuation Method. Totowa, NJ. Rowman and 
Allenheld, 1986. 
Daniel, W. W. Applied Nonparametric Statistics Boston, MA, Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 1978. 
Food and Water, Incorporated. Answers to Questions about Food Irradiation. 
Marshfield, Vermont, (not dated) 
91 
Fox, J.A., DJ. Hayes, J.B. Kliebenstein, D.G. Olson, and J.F. Shogren. "The 
Acceptability of Irradiated Pork" I.S.U. Swine Research Report, November 1993. 
Giddings, G. G. "Summary of the Puerto Rico Mango Consumer Test Market Initiated 
and Coordinated by Isomedix, Inc." Food Irradiation Newsletter 10(1986):56-57. 
Hayes, D. J., J. F. Shogren, S. Y. Shin, and J. B. Kliebenstein. "Valuing Food Safety in 
Experimental Auction Markets." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 
7?(1994):(in press). 
Hoevenagel, R., and J. W. van der Linden. "Effects of Different Descriptions of the 
Ecological Good on Willingness to Pay Values." Ecological Economics 
7(1993):223-238. 
Malone Jr., J. W. "Consumer Willingness to Purchase and to Pay More for Potential 
Benefits of Irradiated Fresh Food Products." Agribusiness 6(1990): 163-177. 
Marcotte, M. "Irradiated Strawberries Enter the U.S. Market." Food Technology 
46(1992):80-86. 
Mitchell, R. C., and R. T. Carson. Using Surveys to Value Public Goods: The 
Contingent Valuation Method Washington D.C., Resources for the Future, 1989. 
Schutz, H. G., C. M. Bruhn, and K. V. Diaz-Knauf. "Consumer Attitude Toward 
Irradiated Foods: Effects of Labeling and Benefits Information." Food 
Technology 43(1989):80-86. 
Shin, S. Y., J. B. Kliebenstein, D. J. Hayes, and J. F. Shogren. "Consumer Willingness 
to Pay for Safer Food Products." Journal of Food Safety 13(1992):51-59. 
Shogren, J. F. "Experimental Markets and Environmental Policy." Agriculture and 
Resource Economic Review 22(1993): 117-129. 
Shogren, J. F., S. Y. Shin, D. J. Hayes, and J. B. Kliebenstein. "Resolving Differences 
in Willingness to Pay and Willingness to Accept." American Economic Review 
84(1994a):255-270. 
Shogren, J. F., J. A. Fox, D. J. Hayes, and J. B. Kliebenstein. "Bid Sensitivity and the 
Structure of the Vickrey Auction." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 
76(1994b):(in press). 
92 
Smith, V. K., and F. R. Johnson. "How do Risk Perceptions Respond to Information? 
The Case of Radon." Review of Economics and Statistics 70(1988): 1-8. 
Terry, D. E., and R. L. Tabor. "Consumer Acceptance of Irradiated Produce." Journal 
of Food Distribution Research 19(1988):63-73. 
Tversky, A. and D. Kahneman. "Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-
Dependent Model." Quarterly Journal of Economics 106(1991): 1039-1061. 
93 
0.5 
0.4 
0.3 
0 . 2  
0 . 1  
0 
Figure 1: Average bid to upgrade to irradiated pork. 
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Figure 2: Prior and posterior assessments of the risk of illness from typical (Type I) 
pork. 
95 
Va I ue 
Ga i ns Losses 
-- c 
Figure 3: An illustration of loss aversion. 
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Table 1. Number of Zero Bidders for Selected Trials. 
Group 
Number of Zero Bidders 
Number in 
Group 
Trial 1 Trials Trial 6 Trial 10 
Group 1 9 4 3 2 2 
Group 2 9 0 2 0 0 
Group 3 10 3 6 9 9 
Group 4 9 5 5 8 8 
Group 5 9 1 2 2 3 
Group 6 7 5 5 6 7 
Total 53 18 23 27 29 
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Table 2. Assessments of Relative Safety for the Type II (Irradiated) Sandwich. 
Assessment # 
Safety relative to 
Type I (typical) 
1 2 3 4 5 
Far Safer 12 14 11 7 7 
Somewhat Safer 27 29 27 15 16 
About as Safe 11 9 14 18 15 
Somewhat less Safe 3 1 1 9 10 
Far less Safe 0 0 0 4 5 
Total 53 53 53 53 53 
Note: Assessment #1 Prior to receiving objective odds of contamination with Trichinella for the 
Type I (typical) sandwich. Prior to bidding. 
Assessment #2 After receiving objective odds of contamination with Trichinella for the 
Type I (typical) sandwich. Prior to bidding. 
Assessment #3 After bidding trial #3. 
Assessment #4 After receiving additional information following bidding trial #5. 
Assessment #5 After bidding trial ^8. 
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Table 3. Effect of Information on Relative Safety Assessments. 
Treatment 
Safety relative to 
Type I (typical) Treatment A Treatment B Treatment C 
Assessment # —> 3 4 3 4 3 4 
Far Safer 1 6 6 0 4 1 
Somewhat Safer 12 10 7 1 8 4 
About as Safe 4 2 6 10 4 6 
Somewhat less Safe 1 0 0 4 0 5 
Far less Safe 0 0 0 4 0 0 
Total 18 18 19 19 16 16 
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Table 4. Variable Definition and Values. 
Definition Mean (S.D.) Median 
Dependent Variables. 
PreBid Average Bid ($) 
Trials 3-5 
0.19 (0.22) 0.10 
PostBid Average Bid ($) 
Trials 8-10 
0.21 (0.43) 0 
Independent Variables 
Risk Log of Subjective risk of 
trichinosis. (Cases per million 
sandwiches) 
4.44 (3.94) 4.47 
Concern Concern for food safety. 
1 - not concerned 
5 - very concerned 
3.96 (0.94) 4 
Age Categorical variable 5.65 (2.22) 6 
Sex 1 if male 0.35 
TmtA Treatment A 
(Positive Information) 
Z
 
II 00
 
TmtB Treatment B 
(Negative Information) 
N = 19 
Note: Age: 1 = < 19; 2 = 20-24; 3 = 25-29; 4 = 30-34; 5 = 35-39; 6 =40-44; 7 = 45-49; 8 
= 50 or over. 
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Table 5. Probit Analysis. 
Variable Prelnfo Postlnfo 
Intercept -1.05 (-0.93) -0.31 (-0.28) 
Risk 0.04 (0.76) 0.03 (0.63) 
Concern 0.44 (1.80)* -0.07 (-0.30) 
Sex -0.45 (-1.06) 0.02 (0.04) 
Age 0.07 (0.70) 0.02 (0.15) 
TmtA -0.27 (-0.46) 1.65 (3.01)*** 
TmtB -0.89 (-1.63) -0.65 (-1.30) 
Number of Obs. 51 51 
Positive Bids 36 24 
% Correct Predictions 0.73 0.80 
0.29 0.41 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. The superscripts *, **, and *" denote statistical 
significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels. 
Treatment C (Positive and Negative Information) is the baseline treatment in both 
regressions. 
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Appendix A 
Introductory Letter 
26 April, 1994 
((ms))((fTiame))((lname)) 
((addl)) 
((add2)) 
((city))((state))((zip)) 
Dear ((ins))(Oname)), 
The Economics Department at Iowa State University is conducting research with residents of 
central Iowa regarding their knowledge and concerns related to food safety. Your household was 
scientifically selected to be included in this study and we would be grateful for your help. 
Within the next two to three weeks you will be contacted by telephone and the person who is 
most responsible for food purchases in your home will be asked if they would be interested in 
participating in a consumer experiment at Iowa State. This session would take less than 2 hours 
of your time and would take place on a Saturday. It would involve no risk to you and you would 
be paid $40.00 for participating. 
To date we have had over 300 people from the Ames and Story County area participate in similar 
sessions and we have received positive comments from almost all of those participants. Most 
people said they found the experience to be interesting and informative and we have had about 60 
people participate in a second session. 
If you have any questions regarding the study, please call Sean Fox at 515-294-7119, and he will 
be happy to help you. Thank you for your consideration. 
Sincerely, 
Dermot J. Hayes, Ph.D. 
Associate Professor 
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Appendix B 
Experimental Instructions 
General Instructions 
You are about to participate in an experiment about decision making. Please follow the 
instructions carefully. 
Specific Instructions 
You will receive $40 for participating in this experiment. Your take home income will consist 
of your initial income ($40) minus the value of goods purchased. 
The experiment has two stages. In stage 1 you will be asked to decide how much you would 
be willing to pay for different candy bars. In stage 2 you will be asked to decide how much 
you would be willing to pay for differing meat products. 
You will submit your bidding price on a recording card. You cannot reveal your bids to any 
other participant. Any communication between bidders will result in an automatic penalty of 
$3. 
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CONSENT FORM 
You are about to participate in an experiment in willingness-to-pay for a food product. 
We need your signed consent if you are to act as a subject. Your participation in the 
experiment is completely voluntary and you may withdraw from the experiment at any time 
without prejudice to you. Results from the experiment will be strictly confidential. Any name 
associated with the experiment will be deleted upon completion of the experiment. 
If you consent to participate in the experiment, please sign the consent form below. 
I have read the consent form statement and agree to act as subject in the experiment, with the 
understanding that I can withdraw from the experiment at any time without prejudice to me. 
Signature 
I L 
Date 
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ABOUT YOU 
1. Your sex: Male Female 
2. Your age: 19 or under 
20-24 
25-29 
30-34 
35-39 
40-44 
45-49 
50 or over 
3. How many individuals live in your household, including yourself? 
If you have children, how old are they? 
4. Please indicate the highest level of education you have completed: 
Grade 8 
9-11 
H.S.Grad, G.E.D. 
Some technical, trade, business school 
Some college, no degree 
B.S., B.A. complete 
Some graduate work, no degree 
M.S., M.A., etc. 
Ph.D., D.D.S., M.D., etc. 
5. Please indicate approximate Household income for 1993: 
Less than $10,000 
10,000 to 20,000 
20,000 to 30,000 
30,000 to 40,000 
40,000 to 50,000 
50,000 to 70,000 
70,000 to 100,000 
More than 100,000 
6. Do you eat red meat? Yes No 
Do you eat poultry? Yes No 
Do you eat fish? Yes No 
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7. How often do you eat red meat, poultry, fish? 
Number of times you eat red meat per week? 
Number of times you eat poultry per week? 
Number of times you eat fish per week? 
8. On a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being "not concerned" and 5 being "very concerned" how 
concerned are you about the safety of the food you buy? 
9. Have you ever had food poisoning? 
Yes No Don't know 
10. If you became sick with a food-borne disease, how much money would you lose per day in 
addition to medical costs (i.e., lost wages)? 
dollars per day 
11. Compared to other people your own age, would you say your physical health is... 
Excellent 
Good 
Fair 
Poor 
12. How healthy do you consider your diet? 
Could be a lot Could be somewhat Is healthy Is healthy as it 
healthier healthier enough could possibly be Not sure 
1 2 3 4 5 
13. Are you currently on a diet? 
Explain 
Yes No 
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14. Over the past year, what are you eating more, less or the same amount of to ensure a healthy 
diet? 
Vegetables/Fruits More Less Same 
Red Meats More Less Same 
Poultry More Less Same 
Fish More Less Same 
Sugar More Less Same 
Fiber More Less Same 
Salt More Less Same 
Dairy Products More Less Same 
Calories More Less Same 
Starch/Potatoes/Pasta More Less Same 
Organic foods More Less Same 
Vit./Min. Supplements More Less Same 
15. On a scale of 1 to 5 with 1 being 'not concerned' and 5 being 'very concerned', indicate how 
you feel about the following nutritional characteristics of food. 
Item Not Concerned Very Concerned 
Fat content 1 2 3 4 5 
Cholesterol levels 1 2 3 4 5 
Salt content 1 2 3 4 5 
Calories 1 2 3 4 5 
Sugar content 1 2 3 4 5 
Vit./Min. content 1 2 3 4 5 
Preservatives 1 2 3 4 5 
Fiber content 1 2 3 4 5 
Chemical additives 1 2 3 4 5 
Freshness 1 2 3 4 5 
Less red meat 1 2 3 4 5 
Artificial sweetener 1 2 3 4 5 
Processed foods 1 2 3 4 5 
Less frying 1 2 3 4 5 
Junk food 1 2 3 4 5 
Protein value 1 2 3 4 5 
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16. On a scale of 1 to 5 with 1 being 'not at all hazardous' and 5 being 'very serious hazard', 
rank the hazard level of each of the following. 
Not at all Very Serious 
Item Hazardous Hazard 
Fats 1 2 3 4 5 
Cholesterol 1 2 3 4 5 
Salt 1 2 3 4 5 
Sugar 1 2 3 4 5 
17. On a scale of 1 to 5 with 1 being 'not at all serious' and 5 being 'very serious', rank how you 
feel each of the following affects food safety. 
Not at all Very 
Item serious Serious 
Spoilage 2 3 4 5 
Pesticides & Herbicides 2 3 4 5 
Chemicals 2 3 4 5 
Additives/preservatives 2 3 4 5 
Pollution 2 3 4 5 
Bacteria/salmonella 2 3 4 5 
Bugs/pests/rats 2 3 4 5 
Antibiotics 2 3 4 5 
Irradiation of food 2 3 4 5 
Animal growth enhancers 2 3 4 5 
Genetic engineering/biotechnology 2 3 4 5 
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18. On a scale of 1 to 5 with 1 being 'not concerned' and 5 being 'very concerned', rank how you 
feel regarding the following issues in production agriculture. 
Not Very 
Item concerned concerned 
Crop Production 
Soil erosion/tillage 1 2 3 4 5 
Pesticides/herbicides 1 2 3 4 5 
Genetic engineering/biotech 1 2 3 4 5 
Livestock Production 
Confinement systems 1 2 3 4 5 
Animal welfare 1 2 3 4 5 
Antibiotics 1 2 3 4 5 
Growth enhancers 1 2 3 4 5 
Genetic engineering/biotech 1 2 3 4 5 
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Instructions for Stage 1 
1. You own the candv bar in front of vou. 
2. You will be asked to indicate the amount you would be willing to pay to trade your candy bar 
for a diiferent candy bar. Do not state what you would pay for the entire other candy bar. 
Only state the difference you are willing to pay to change ^e candy bar you own for the other 
candy bar. 
For example, let's say you are willing to pay $x for your candy bar and $y for a different 
candy bar. The difference ($y - $x) is what you are willing to pay to exchange your candy 
bar for the other candy bar. If you prefer the candy bar you own, and do not want to trade 
it for the other candy bar, a zero bid is appropriate. 
3. We will ask you to write your bid for the other candy bar on a recording card. We will 
collect your bids and display the I.D. number of the highest bidder and the price he/she will 
pay for the other candy bar on the blackboard. The price paid bv the highest bidder will be 
the amount of the 2nd highest bid. 
For example, if the highest bid is $a and the second-highest bid is $b, the highest bidder will 
receive the other candy bar and must pay $b. 
4. There will be five rounds of bidding (trials), but only one trial will be binding. After the five 
trials are complete, we will draw a number to determine which trial is binding. The highest 
bidder in that trial will exchange his/her candy bar for the other candy bar and pay the 
displayed price (i.e. the 2nd highest bidt 
Note: Ties will be decided by a coin toss. 
Note: In this auction it is in your best interest to bid the amount that you are truly willing to pay to 
change one candy bar for the other. If you bid more than your true willingness-to-pay you 
increase your chances of purchasing the other candy bar but you may have to pay a price that 
is greater than what you are willing to pay. On the other hand, if you bid less than the 
amount that you are truly willing to pay then you may lose the chance to purchase the other 
candy bar at a price that you would be willing to pay. 
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Questions for Stage 1 #. 
Please answer the following questions, which are designed to help you understand stage 1. Do not 
hesitate to ask the researchers if you have questions. 
1. Suppose that person A is the highest bidder in the first trial, person B is the highest bidder 
in the third trial, and person C is the highest bidder in the flf^ trial. If, after five trials are 
finished, we randomly select the third trial, then who will trade their candy bar for the other 
candy bar? 
2. If $a is the highest bid in the third trial, and the second highest bid is $b, what price would 
be paid for the other candy bar? $ 
3. If your bid is not the highest in the third trial, which is randomly selected, how much will you 
pay for the other candy bar? $ 
I l l  
Questions for Stage 2 #. 
Please answer the following questions, which are designed to help you understand stage 2. 
Do not hesitate to ask the monitors if you have questions. 
1. There will be ten bidding trials. If person A is the highest bidder in the first trial, person B 
is the highest bidder in the eighth trial, and the eighth trial is selected, who will receive the 
product? 
2. If your $a bid is the highest in the eighth trial, and the second highest bid is $/3, what price 
will you pay for the product? $ 
Please answer the following questions. 
1. Have you ever heard of the food borne pathogen Trichinella ? yes no 
2. What foods do you think are the important sources of Trichinella in the United States? 
Please list the type of food items. 
3. Have you ever heard of or read about irradiation for food products ? yes 
no 
4. Where have you heard or read about irradiation ? 
5. How would you characterize your attitude towards food irradiation ? positive 
negative 
neutral 
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Instructions for Stage 2 
In Stage 2 you will be bidding on pork sandwiches. Here is a brief description of the sandwiches. 
1. You own a grilled pork sandwich made from the Type I pork meat. Everyone has the same 
Type I meat. 
2. Let's say you are willing to pay $y for the Type I meat and $z for the Type II meat. The 
difference ($z - $y) is what you are willing to pay to exchange Type I for Type II. Please 
indicate your willingness to pay to exchange your Type I meat for the Type II meat. Only 
state the difference ($z - $y) that you are willing to pay. If you do not wish to exchange your 
Type I meat for the Type II meat, then a bid of zero is appropriate. 
3. There will be ten trials. After all ten trials are complete, we will randomly select one of the 
ten trials to be the binding trial that determines who buys the Type II meat. 
Note: The meat will have to be consumed to leave with the take-home income. This applies to all 
participants, not just the winning bidders. 
Note: In this auction it is in your best interest to bid the amount that you are truly willing to pay to 
change one sandwich for the other. If you bid more than your true willingness-to-pay you 
increase your chances of purchasing the other sandwich but you may have to pay a price that 
is greater than what you are willing to pay. On the other hand, if you bid less than the 
amount that you are truly willing to pay then you may lose the chance to purchase the other 
sandwich at a price that you would be willing to pay. 
Type I Type II 
This is a typical pork sandwich. The pork 
in this sandwich has a typical chance of 
being contaminated with Trichinella. 
The pork in this sandwich has been 
treated by irradiation to control 
Trichinella. Because of this treatment 
we can guarantee that this pork will not 
cause Trichinosis. 
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Type I 
This is a typical pork sandwich. The pork 
in this sandwich has a typical chance of 
being contaminated with Trichinella. 
Type II 
The pork in this sandwich has been 
treated by irradiation to control 
Trichinella. Because of this treatment 
we can guarantee that this pork will not 
cause Trichinosis. 
1. If 1 million people were to eat a Type I (typical) sandwich, how many of them do you think 
would become ill from Trichinella. 
2. Do you consider the Type H (irradiated) sandwich to be: 
far safer than Type I 
somewhat safer than Type I 
about as safe as Type I 
somewhat less safe than Type I 
far less safe than Type I 
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Type I Type II 
This is a typical pork sandwich. If you eat 
this pork, there is approximately a 1 in 
2.628.0QQ chance that you will become ill 
from Trichinella. 
The pork in this sandwich has been 
treated by irradiation to control 
Trichinella. Because of this treatment we 
can guarantee that this pork will not 
cause Trichinosis. 
Food Irradiation 
The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has recently approved the use of ionizing 
radiation to control Trichinella in pork products and Salmonella in poultry. Based on it's 
evaluation of several toxicity studies, the FDA concluded that irradiation of food products at 
approved levels did not present a toxicological hazard to consumers nor did it adversely effect 
the nutritional value of the product. 
Irradiation of pork products at approved levels results in a 10,000 fold reduction in the 
viability of Trichinella organisms present in the meat. 
The forms of ionizing energy used in food processing include gamma rays, x-rays, and 
accelerated electrons. Ionizing energy works by breaking chemical bonds in organic 
molecules. When a sufficient number of critical bonds are split in the bacteria and other pests 
in food, the organisms are killed. 
The energy levels of the gamma rays, accelerated electrons, and x-rays legally permitted for 
processing food do not induce measurable radioactivity in food. 
This description is based on a review of the scientific literature on food irradiation. 
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Trichinella 
Pork products can be irradiated for the control of a parasite, Trichinella, which causes a 
disease called Trichinosis. The symptoms of the disease are abdominal pains, vomiting, 
diarrhea, headaches, fever, and the chills. Each year, about 100 cases of Trichinosis are 
diagnosed in the United States, but the actual number of cases is probably much higher. Of 
the people who get Trichinosis, about 1 out of 100 will die. 
By using the irradiation process, which has been approved by the Food and Drug 
Administration, the risk of contracting trichinosis is almost eliminate. 
The process uses either gamma rays, x-rays, or electrons to kill organisms like Trichinella. 
The level of irradiation used to treat pork does not cause food to become radioactive. The 
Food and Drug Administration concluded that irradiation of pork does not present a health 
hazard and it does not affect the nutritional value of food. 
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Type I 
This is a typical pork sandwich. If you eat 
this pork, there is approximately a 1 in 
2.628.000 chance that you will become ill 
from Trichinella. 
#. 
Type II 
The pork in this sandwich has been 
treated by irradiation to control 
Trichinella. Because of this treatment we 
can guarantee that this pork will not 
cause Trichinosis. 
Do you consider the Type II (irradiated) sandwich to be: 
far safer than Type I 
somewhat safer than Type I 
about as safe as Type I 
somewhat less safe than Type I 
far less safe than Type I 
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3. 
Type 1 Type II 
This is a typical pork sandwich. If you eat 
this pork, there is approximately a 1 in 
2.628.000 chance that you will become ill 
from Trichinella. 
The pork in this sandwich has been 
treated by irradiation to control 
Trichinella. Because of this treatment we 
can guarantee that this pork will not 
cause Trichinosis. 
Do you consider the Type II (irradiated) sandwich to be; 
far safer than Type I 
somewhat safer than Type I 
about as safe as Type I 
somewhat less safe than Type I 
far less safe than Type I 
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Type I Type II 
This is a typical pork sandwich. If you eat 
this pork, there is approximately a 1 in 
2.628.000 chance that you will become ill 
from Trichinella. 
The pork in this sandwich has been 
treated by irradiation to control 
Trichinella. Because of this treatment we 
can guarantee that this pork will not 
cause Trichinosis. 
Food Irradiation 
Food irradiation (also called ion pasteurization) is a process that destroys harmful bacteria and 
pathogens by treating foods with ionizing radiation. 
Food irradiation has been shown to be highly effective in destroying Trichinella in pork, 
Salmonella in poultry, E.coli in beef, and other bacteria and parasites responsible for food 
poisoning. Extensive research has proven that this process is a safe and reliable way to 
improve the quality of food. Because food irradiation does not involve washing foods with 
chemicals and leaves no residue in food, it is safer than many current food processing 
techniques. 
The Food and Drug administration has approved irradiation for use on wheat, potatoes, pork, 
poultry, fruits, vegetables and spices. The process has also been approved the American 
Medical Association and the World Health Organization. It has been successfully used in over 
20 countries since 1950. Food irradiation is especially useful for those most at risk from 
food-bone illness such as victims of AIDS, organ transplant patients, and the elderly, and was 
approved for hospital diets in the U.K. as far back as 1969. 
Each year as many as 9,000 people die in the U.S. from food-borne illness. Millions more 
suffer short term illness due to pathogens such as Salmonella, Listeria and E.coli. By 
eliminating these pathogens from food, irradiation can help to greatly reduce the number of 
food borne illnesses. 
This description is based on information supplied by the American Council on Science and Health, 
a consumer education association. 
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Type I Type II 
This is a typical pork sandwich. If you eat 
this pork, there is approximately a 1 in 
2.628.000 chance that you will become ill 
from Trichinella. 
The pork in this sandwich has been 
treated by irradiation to control 
Trichinella. Because of this treatment we 
can guarantee that this pork will not 
cause Trichinosis. 
Food Irradiation 
Food irradiation is a process whereby food is exposed to radioactive materials, and receives 
as much as 300,000 rads of radiation -the equivient of 30 million chest x-rays- in order to 
extend the shelf life of the food and kill insects and bacteria. 
While it is unlikely that food products themselves will become radioactive, irradiation results 
in the creation of chemicals called radiolytic products in food. Some radiolytic products are 
known carcinogens. Studies have also suggested that irradiation may be linked to cancer and 
birth defects. Furthermore, foods exposed to radiation contain lower levels of essential 
vitamins. 
Food irradiation can kill most of the pathogenic bacteria present in food, but so can proper 
cooking. Moreover, doses of radiation that are adequate to kill Salmonella or Trichinella are 
not enough to kill the bacteria that cause botulism. However, such doses would kill the 
bacteria which signal spoilage through a foul odor. Thus, with irradiation, we would not be 
able to rely on the usual warning signs that tell us when food is dangerous to eat. 
Food irradiation was developed in the 1950's by the Atomic Energy Commission. The 
objective was to seek potential uses for the byproducts of nuclear weapons production. 
Today's food irradiation industry is a private, for-profit business enterprise with ties to the 
U.S. nuclear weapons and nuclear power industries. 
Food irradiation also poses potential environmental dangers because of the use of radioactive 
materials in the process. Workers can be exposed on the job, and entire communities can be 
exposed in the event of a leak from the plant. Plus, radioactive materials would have to be 
transported around the country, putting thousands of people at risk in the case of a traffic 
accident. 
This description is based on information supplied by Food and Water, Inc., a consumer 
advocacy group. 
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4. 
Type I Type II 
This is a typical pork sandwich. If you eat 
this pork, there is approximately a 1 in 
2.628.000 chance that you will become ill 
from Trichinella. 
The pork in this sandwich has been 
treated by irradiation to control 
Trichinella. Because of this treatment we 
can guarantee that this pork will not 
cause Trichinosis. 
Do you consider the Type II (irradiated) sandwich to be: 
far safer than Type I 
somewhat safer than Type I 
about as safe as Type I 
somewhat less safe than Type I 
far less safe than Type I 
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Type I Type II 
This is a typical pork sandwich. If you eat 
this pork, there is approximately a 1 in 
2.628.000 chance that you will become ill 
from Trichinella. 
The pork in this sandwich has been 
treated by irradiation to control 
Trichinella. Because of this treatment we 
can guarantee that this pork will not 
cause Trichinosis. 
Do you consider the Type II (irradiated) sandwich to be: 
far safer than Type I 
somewhat safer than Type I 
about as safe as Type I 
somewhat less safe than Type I 
far less safe than Type I 
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Exit Qu^tions i 
Please answer the following questions before you leave. 
1. What type of risk(s), if any, did you associate with the Type II (irradiated) sandwich. 
2. If 1 million people were to eat a Type I (typical) sandwich, how many of them do you 
think would become ill from Trichinella. 
3. Did you change your bid at any stage in the auction? Yes No 
4. If you changed your bid, did you Increase Decrease Both 
4a. What piece of information caused you to increase your bid? Was it: 
Market prices 
Description of irradiation 
Other 
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What part of the description caused you to increase your bid? 
What piece of information caused you to decrease your bid? Was it: 
Market prices 
Description of irradiation 
Other 
What part of the description caused you to decrease your bid? 
Having completed the experiment, how would you characterize your attitude to food 
irradiation. 
positive 
negative 
neutral 
Thank you for participating. 
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CHAPTER 4. DETERMINANTS OF CONSUMER ACCEPTABILITY 
OF BOVINE SOMATOTROPIN* 
A paper to be submitted to the Review of 
Agricultural Economics 
John A. Fox" 
Abstract 
Consumer acceptability of bovine somatotropin (bST) is investigated using a non-
hypothetical laboratory experimental auction. The auction procedure was used to 
determine willingness to pay to exchange milk from a cow that had been treated with bST 
for "normal" milk. Heckman's two-stage method was used to model the subjects' bids 
for "normal" milk. The results show that the primary determinant of acceptability of bST 
is the subject's level of concern with genetic engineering and biotechnology. Significant 
male/female differences were also found. 
* Thanks to Bruce Babcock, Dermot Hayes, and Jason Shogren for valuable conunents and suggestions. 
The author is currently an assistant professor. Department of Agricultural Economics, Kansas State 
University, Manhattan, KS 66502. This work was completed when the author was a graduate assistant at the 
Department of Economics, Iowa State University, Ames, lA 50011. 
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Introduction 
Following much investigation and debate the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
approved bovine somatotropin, a growth hormone for dairy cows, for commercial use in 
February 1994. FDA regulations do not require labelling of milk or milk products from 
animals treated with synthetic bST but they do not preclude the labelling of products from 
untreated animals. A number of supermarket chains have indicated that they will not 
carry milk from treated animals and at least one ice cream manufacturer (Ben & Jerry's) 
refuses to use milk from treated animals. Since consumers will effectively have a choice 
between milk products from bST treated or untreated animals, the commercial success or 
failure of this new technology will depend critically on consumer reaction. 
To date the most common means of investigating consumer concerns about issues 
such as bST have been surveys. McGuirk and Kaiser (1991) conducted a survey of 
consumers in New York and Virginia. About one quarter of their respondents expressed 
some doubt about the safety of "bST milk" and respondents in both states indicated that 
they would decrease their purchases of fluid milk by 18-20 percent if bST were 
introduced. Smith and Warland (1992) summarize the results of a number of consumer 
surveys regarding attitudes towards bST. They found that 56.7 percent of the survey 
respondents were negatively inclined towards bST. 
However, the situation faced by an interviewee in a survey differs from that which 
potential buyers of new products will experience in retail stores. The relative lack of 
realism, information and time that constrain the survey approach makes it difficult to 
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elicit true attitudes and can lead to responses that depend on the way the question was 
asked (Buhr et al.). Surveys also provide respondents with the opportunity to provide 
strategic rather than true responses (see Whitehead for an example). A person who 
opposed the introduction of bST might therefore find it advantageous to overstate the 
amount by which his/her milk purchases would decline in the hope of sending a message 
to potential users of the product. Furthermore, many surveys on bST do not explicitly 
account for the availability of milk products from untreated animals. 
This study uses a non-hypothetical auction method similar to that used by Shogren 
et al.(1994) to investigate consumer acceptability of milk produced by animals treated 
with bST. I account for the availability of both types of milk by asking auction 
participants to bid to exchange one type of milk for the other. The next section of this 
paper outlines the advantages of the experimental approach and describes in detail the 
experimental design used in this study. In the third section I present a statistical model 
based on a procedure develop>ed by Heckman (1976, 1979) and in the fourth I discuss the 
results. The final section contains some concluding remarks. 
Methodology 
Laboratory experimental auctions (Coursey, Cox et al., Shogren) have specific 
advantages over hypothetical survey techniques. The methods used in this study involved 
real food, real money and actual monetary consequences' for the participants. 
Participants were given full information about the product and repeated opportunities to 
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participate in an auction market. Because the market required participants to realize the 
actual monetary consequences of their bidding, they had an incentive to bid honestly. 
Subjects were paid $18 to participate in an experiment but were informed that a 
product would have to be consumed in order for them to leave with their take-home 
income. This "requirement-to-consume" ensured that participants paid careful attention to 
the process and gave serious consideration to the bids they made. 
A third advantage of the experimental method is the potential for eliminating non-
response bias. Low response rates are a common problem with survey techniques 
(Cummings et al.). For example, in the survey reported by McGuirk and Kaiser only 
one-third of the surveyed households responded. In this study, potential participants were 
not given any information about the experiment at the time they were recruited. Thus, 
willingness to participate is independent of a subject's attitude to the product under 
consideration. 
The experiments used an incentive compatible, sealed-bid auction mechanism 
designed to induce participants to bid an amount equal to their true willingness-to-pay. In 
this auction (Vickrey), the highest bidder receives the product but pays an amount equal 
to the second highest bid. The fact that the winning bidder does not have to pay the 
amount that he/she bids removes the incentive to underbid one's true value which is 
present in a first price auction. In the Vickrey second price auction there is no benefit 
from either overbidding or underbidding one's true valuation of the item being auctioned. 
This mechanism has been successfully applied in various experimental settings (Coursey, 
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Shogren et al.) but it should be noted that, in some situations, the demand revealing 
properties of the Vickrey auction have been challenged (Coursey and Smith, Kagel et 
al.). Repeated trials of this auction mechanism are used to allow for learning (see 
Menkhaus et al. for a review of auction methods). 
Experimental Design 
Each experiment consisted of three stages.^ In Stage 1 participants were given a 
general description of the type of study in which they would be participating and were 
asked to sign a consent form if they agreed to participate. They were then asked to 
complete a questionnaire which was used to collect information about dietary habits and 
experiences, attitudes and beliefs about food safety issues and some demographic 
information. 
Stage 2 was designed to familiarize the participants with the second-price, sealed-
bid auction. Each participant was given an identification number (ID), a $3 endowment, 
and a regular sized, brand name candy bar (brand X). A different candy bar (brand Y) 
was displayed, and participants were asked to submit a sealed-bid indicating the 
maximum he or she would be willing to pay to exchange brand X for brand Y. After all 
bids were collected, the monitor displayed on the blackboard the ID number of the 
highest bidder, and the market price—the second-highest bid. Five auction trials were 
conducted. Note that to control for wealth effects, participants were fully aware that only 
one of the five trials would be binding.^ The binding trial was randomly selected after 
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all five trials were complete. The highest bidder in the binding trial exchanged his or her 
brand X candy bar for brand Y and paid the market price, i.e. the second highest bid in 
the binding trial. The cash transaction reminded all participants that their bidding had 
real monetary consequences. 
Stage 3 introduced the milk products. Each participant was given a $15 
endowment and a 16 oz glass of Type I (bST) milk. A Type II (typical) glass of milk 
was then auctioned using 20 trials. For the first 10 trials, participants were provided 
with the following descriptions: 
Type I: This milk was produced by a typical dairy cow that received synthetic 
bovine somatotropin in research trials. 
Type II: This milk was produced by a typical dairy cow. 
After the 10th trial, the monitor provided the following information about bST: 
Bovine somatotropin (bST) is a protein produced in the pituitary gland of a dairy 
cow that regulates and stimulates milk production. Through advances in genetic 
engineering, synthetic bST can now be manufactured using recombinant DNA 
technology. It is then injected into cows to increase milk yields. The frequency of 
these injections may range from once a day to once every 14 to 28 days. 
Dairy cows treated with artificial bST have produced from 10 to 25 percent more 
milk in experimental trials. They have also shown an increase in feeding 
efficiency. The amount of bST in milk from treated cows has not been shown to 
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differ from that found naturally in milk. However, there is concern by some 
people that too little research has been conducted to assure the safety of milk and 
dairy products from cows treated with bST. bST is currently under regulatory 
review and is expected to be approved soon by the Food and Drug Administration. 
Ten "informed" bids were then elicited. At the end of the auction one of the 20 
trials was randomly selected to be binding. The highest bidder in the binding trial 
received the Type II milk and paid the second-highest bid in the binding trial. Everyone 
else kept the Type I milk. All participants were required to drink their milk in order to 
leave with their take-home-pay and were aware of this requirement at the beginning of 
the milk auction. 
The experiments were carried out at five universities in Iowa, Arkansas, 
Massachusetts and California between July 1992 and March 1993. Fifteen undergraduate 
students from a range of degree programs participated in each experiment. Care was 
taken to replicate the experiments as closely as possible in a similar environment at all 
five locations. All experiments were conducted by the same investigator. 
Data 
Independent variables were obtained from the participants' responses to the 
questionnaire which was completed at the beginning of the experiment and from a 
question about bST asked before the milk auction. Among the questions asked were level 
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of concern for food safety, level of concern for animal welfare, prior knowledge of bST, 
and attitude toward biotechnology. In most questions the participant was required to rank 
his/her level of concern on a scale from 0 to 4. Some variables were constructed as a 
simple average of responses to several related questions. Table I presents the variable 
definitions and average values. 
Figure 1 shows how the mean bid of each of the five experiments behaves through 
the twenty rounds of bidding. It indicates that for some groups, in particular urban 
California, the information given to subjects following Trial 10 had a significant effect on 
the average bid for "normal'"* milk. We focus the analysis on two areas - the first bid to 
avoid "bST milk", and the effect on bids of the information presented following trial 10. 
Analyzing the first bid is analogous to analyzing the participants initial gut reaction to 
being confronted with the choice between the two types of milk. Figure 2 shows the 
frequency distribution of these first round bids. 
To examine the effect of new information on bidding we needed to choose 
representative trials. We considered a number of issues in making these choices. First, 
previous work with multiple trial auctions (Coursey) has found that a number of trials are 
required before subjects settle on their true willingness-to-pay. For this reason we 
decided not to choose from trials 1,2, and 3 nor from trials 11,12, and 13. Second, due 
to the possibility of final trial effects, we decided not to use Trial 20. We could have 
chosen one trial at random between say trial 4 and trial 9 before information and from 
trials 14 to 19 following information but this involved the possibility of choosing a non-
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representative trial such as trial 9 in rural California. Instead, we decided to use an 
average bid over a three trial interval where bids attained the greatest degree of stability. 
In the first half of the auction bids were most stable over trials 4 to 6 in rural 
California, over trials 6 to 8 in Arkansas, over trials 7 to 9 in urban California, and over 
trials 8 to 10 in Iowa and Massachusetts. Following the description of bST after trial 10 
the bids were most stable over trials 14 to 16 in all locations except Massachusetts where 
we used the average over trials 18 to 20. Figures 3 and 4 show the frequency 
distributions of the stabilized bids. They look somewhat similar to Figure 2, with 21 and 
34 zero bids compared to 33 for the first trial. However, comparing the distributions 
does not reveal the extent to which individual bidders might have changed their bids as a 
result of obtaining new information or market experience. 
Statistical Model 
The distributions of bids for "normal" milk show that over 40% of all bids are 
zeros. Conventional regression methods such as OLS will not adequately account for the 
qualitative difference between zero (limit) bids and positive (nonlimit) bids (Greene). 
One possible solution is to discard the zero observations and perform OLS only on the 
positive bids. This implies an assumption that the subset of positive bids is randomly 
drawn from the population of all bids. In the present case, however, it is clear that there 
is self-selection by participants into the subset of positive bids. Least squares analysis 
ignores this selection and the resulting estimates will be biased. 
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The Tobit model (Tobin) is commonly used to deal with zero consumption or cases 
in which the dependent variable is censored. One feature of this model is the fact that 
limit observations are treated as comer solutions (Blaylock and Blisard). However, the 
assumption that a zero bid represents a traditional comer solution may not be applicable 
in the present case. First, subjects were not income constrained having just received an 
$18 participation fee. Second, while it is likely that zero bidders would consume the 
"normal" milk if it were cheaper than the "bST milk", such a scenario is unlikely to 
occur in reality. 
A more general method of dealing with models involving censored, truncated or 
self-selection data was proposed by Heckman (1976, 1979). Heckman's approach 
considers the bias that arises in such cases to be a case of omitted variable bias. The 
two-stage procedure he proposed involves estimating the values of the omitted variable in 
the first stage and then including those estimates as regressors in the second stage to 
allow consistent estimation by least squares. An advantage of this method is that it 
provides a measure of the degree of self-selection. 
Even in the absence of selection bias, the two stage method facilitates an intuitively 
appealing decomposition of the bidding decision. The first decision faced by the 
participant is whether or not to bid for the "normal" milk. If the participant considers the 
"bST milk" and the "normal" milk to be equivalent the decision will be to not bid (i.e. to 
bid zero). For the participant who considers the "normal" milk to be superior, the 
second decision is how much to bid for the "normal" milk. Heckman's procedure, by 
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modelling the two stages separately, allows different variables to influence each decision 
and furthermore allows a single variable to have different effects in each stage. An 
example illustrating this feature of a two-stage estimator is described in Fin and Schmidt 
(1984). 
Consider a model of the bidding process to be as follows': 
(la) t £7., if/' 
(lb) l/j,. ie/ 
where I' is the subset of participants with non-zero bids. The first equation can be 
viewed as the continuous inverse demand equation for the glass of "normal" milk where 
Y,i represents the bid of participant i. Yji is a qualitative variable taking on the value of 
one when participant i has a nonzero bid, zero otherwise. Instead of postulating an 
indicator variable, we assume that all positive realizations of Yjj are assigned the value 
one and all negative realizations are assigned the value zero. Xzj and X,; are the sets of 
explanatory variables which influence the decision to bid and the level of bid. We 
assume for now that the errors are normally distributed with mean zero. The relevant 
properties of their joint distribution are discussed below. 
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Following Heckman (1979), if we let !'=! (i.e. assume that all participants submit 
a positive bid) the population regression function for equation (la) can be written as 
£{r„|x„) . 
The question arises as to whether the observations available for estimating equation (la) 
represent a random drawing from the population. In our case observations on Y,; occur 
as a result of a selection rule. A positive bid occurs only when the decision has been 
made to submit a non-zero bid, i.e. when Yjj takes on the value one. The regression 
function for the subsample of positive bidders can thus be represented as 
• X„P, + ^2,=" 
which, given the definition of Y2\ can be written 
(2) ^ 
If Uii and Uji are independent, the conditional expectation of U,; is zero and least squares 
can be used to estimate 6, on the subsample of non-zero bidders. In general we do not 
expect the errors to be independent. This illustrates that the nature of the bias resulting 
from an estimation on the selected sample is due to the omission of the final term in 
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equation (2). Heckman points out that the Tobit model arises as a special case of this 
model when U,; = Uai, X,; = X2\, and 6i s 
Assuming that the joint distribution of U,; and U2i is bivariate normal, and using a 
result for the conditional mean of U,i (see Heckman), equation (2) can be written as 
<3) 
("22)'^ 
where ai2 and 022 represent the covariance between U,j and U2i and the variance of U2i. 
Xi is the inverse Mills ratio (IMR) and is given by 
. _ AZ) 
' 1-F(Z.) 
where f and F represent the standard normal density and distribution functions, and 
^ _ ^2i^l 
'' 
The IMR is a decreasing function of the probability that an observation is selected into 
the sample, that probability being given by [l-F(Zi)]. 
The two-stage estimation procedure is as follows. First, probit analysis on the full 
sample is used to estimate parameters of the probability that a participant will bid a 
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positive amount to upgrade to the "normal" milk. The estimated parameters of the probit 
equation allow for the estimation of 2^ and hence for the estimation of the IMR for each 
observation. The estimated IMR is then used as a regressor in the OLS equation (3) 
which is estimated only over participants who bid a positive amount. Inclusion of the 
IMR allows for the consistent estimation of /3, using least squares. 
Results 
First Bid for "normal" Milk 
The first analysis deals with the initial bid to avoid "bST milk". Table 2 presents 
the results from the probit and 2nd stage OLS estimations. The probit results indicate 
that attitude towards genetic engineering/biotechnology (Tech) has the most statistically 
significant influence on the probability of bidding for "normal" milk. The coefficient has 
the expected positive sign and is significant at the 5 percent level. Of the other 
coefficients, the relatively large negative effect associated with increased concern for food 
safety (Sfty) goes against a priori expectations. 
The 2nd stage OLS estimates indicate a significant positive effect associated with 
concern for animal welfare (Welf). The coefficient on X is not significant leading us to 
conclude that deleting zero bids and running OLS on the remaining observations would 
not seriously bias the estimates. None of the remaining coefficients in the second stage 
are statistically significant. It is notable that an indication of prior knowledge of bST 
(Know) had no effect at either stage. Likelihood ratio tests at both the first and second 
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stages failed to reject the hypothesis of no regional effects. This is not surprising given 
the clustering of average bids evident in Figure 1. 
Effects of Infonnatioii 
The effect of providing information about bST following the tenth trial is shown in 
Figure 1. The large decrease in the average bid of the urban California participants is 
the most striking. To quantify the effect of information we combine our pre- and post-
information stabilized bids in a single regression using a dummy variable to distinguish 
between them. Tables 3 and 4 present the results. 
The first probit equation in Table 3 shows the outcome of constrained estimation 
where coefficients are restricted to be equivalent in the pre- and post-information stages. 
The second equation shows the results from the unconstrained estimation. The only 
significant dummy coefficient in the 2nd equation is that on DSex. The signs and relative 
magnitudes of the coefficients on Sex and DSex in the 2 equations indicate that 
information has a significant effect on the probability for females to bid to avoid the "bST 
milk". Before receiving the description of bST, males and females were equally likely to 
bid, whereas with the new information females were less likely to bid than males. The 
first equation also indicates that attitude to biotechnology again has a significant influence 
on the probability of bidding. 
To illustrate the effects of sample selection, the second stage OLS equation was 
estimated with and without the IMR calculated from probit equation 1. Table 4 shows 
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the results. The coefficient on X in the first OLS equation is significant at the 10 percent 
level. This suggests that exclusion of the IMR would bias the remaining coefficients and 
this is evident in comparing the two equations. For example, when the IMR is excluded 
the coefficient on Welf (concern for animal welfare) is double its unbiased value and 
appears significant. Also note the sign reversal in coefficients on Sex and Tech. 
In the first OLS equation, the coefficient on sex is positive indicating a tendency 
for females to bid more than males. The coefficients on Sfty, Know (prior knowledge of 
bST), and the dummy variable for the Iowa group are significant at the 10 percent level. 
Prior knowledge of bST has a negative effect on the bid. 
The analysis of stabilized bids indicates stronger regional differences in bidding 
behavior than were observed with initial bids. This is not surprising given the bidding 
patterns shown in Figure 1. Likelihood ratio tests indicate that regional differences are 
significant at the 5 percent level for both the first and second stages. 
Nonparametric tests 
In another test of the effects of information and repeated market experience the 
distributions of bids were compared using the Wilcoxon signed-rank test (Freund and 
Walpole,p529). Comparison of initial bids (median = $0.05) to stabilized pre-
information bids (median = $0.30) indicated that the difference was significant at the 5 
percent level (z=4.39) and we conclude that repeated market experience raised the level 
of bids. A similar comparison of pre- and post-information bids leads us to conclude that 
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the information we supplied about bST resulted in lower bids (z=1.76), though this result 
is primarily due to the reduction in bidding by the urban California group. Region 
speciHc comparisons of the changes in bidding between trial 10 and trial 11 indicated 
significant decreases in both urban California and Arkansas. 
Discussion 
The overall level of acceptability of bST found in these experiments appears 
similar to that found in surveys. In trial 1, 33 of 75 uninformed participants (44 
percent), having received $18, would not pay anything to upgrade from a glass of "bST 
milk" to a glass of "normal" milk. After receiving information about bST, a total of 40 
participants (53 percent) submitted zero bids in at least 5 of the final 10 trials. Smith and 
Warland's (1992) review of surveys on the issue found that 60 percent of those surveyed 
said that they would not change their milk purchases if bST were introduced. 
The fact that 11 of 75 participants (15 percent) were willing to pay $1.50 or more 
to avoid a glass of bST milk points to the possibility of a profitable niche market for milk 
products from untreated animals. This 15 percent appears to correspond to Smith and 
Warland's figure of 10 percent of survey respondents who indicated that they would stop 
purchasing milk if bST were introduced. A more likely scenario is that many of those 
people will seek out milk and milk products labelled as coming from untreated animals 
and that they will be prepared to pay a premium for those products. 
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Conclusions 
Nonhypothetical auction experiments have recentiy emerged as a viable alternative 
to consumer surveys. The advantage of these experiments is that they can closely 
replicate the consumers' point of purchase decision. This approach was used to examine 
the acceptability of "bST milk" to students in Arkansas, California (urban and rural), 
Iowa and Massachusetts. 
Heckman's two-step procedure was used to model participants' bids to upgrade 
from a glass of "bST milk" to a glass of "normal" milk. Results indicate that attitude to 
genetic engineering, as revealed on a questionnaire, is an important factor in explaining 
the bid to avoid bST. This conclusion, while appearing to state the obvious, indicates a 
degree of consistency between what people say they will do and what they actually do. 
The apparent lack of such consistency is currently a point of debate in the contingent 
valuation literature. In the context of bST it suggests that efforts to foster more favorable 
attitudes towards biotechnology may be worthwhile in the attempt to boost consumer 
acceptability. 
The importance of providing consumers with accurate, scientifically balanced 
information about biotechnological products was borne out in these experiments. In 
particular, the description of bST given to the urban Califomian subjects served to almost 
completely eliminate their concerns about the product. The description of bST also 
resulted in a significant difference in bidding behavior between males and females, which 
was not evident before information was provided. Following information, females were 
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less likely to bid to avoid bST than males. This suggests that females were more readily 
reassured that "bST milk" is the same as "normal" milk. The implication of this finding, 
if accurate, is that efforts aimed at reassuring consumers of the safety and wholesomeness 
of these products might more profitably be directed to a female audience. 
Finally, the fact that some participants consistently bid in excess of $1.00 to avoid 
the bST milk, with or without information, suggests that a profitable niche market may 
exist for products labelled as coming from untreated animals. 
Footnotes 
1. See Davis and Holt (pp.25,449) for a discussion on financial incentives. 
2. Experimental instructions are available on request. 
3. See Davis and Holt (pp.451) for a discussion of wealth effects in experimental markets. 
4. The use of the word "normal" to describe milk from a cow that was not treated with bST is 
not meant to imply that milk from animals treated with bST is "abnormal". The word is used 
only to avoid tiresome repetition of the longer but more correct description. The same 
applies to the term "bST milk". 
5. This section draws heavily on Heckman's work. 
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Californla(raril) CsliforoiaCnrbaa) 
Figure 1. Average willingness to pay for "non-bST" (normal) milk. 
From Fox et al. (1994), 
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Frequency 
j_ 
_i_ 1 
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 
Dollars 
1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 l.S >1.5 
Figure 2. Trial 1 bids for "non-bST" milk. (N=75) 
Mean Bid - $0.32; Median Bid - $0.05. 
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Frequency 
40 
0 0.1 0.8 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.8 1.3 1.4 1.5 >1.5 
Dollars 
Figure 3. Stabilized Pre-Information bids for "non-bST" milk. (N=75) 
Mean Bid - $0.74; Median Bid - $0.30. 
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Freauen^ 
40 
ml _j I L 
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 >1.5 
Dollars 
Figure 4. Stabilized Post-Information bids for "non-bST" milk. (N=75) 
Mean Bid - $0.46; Median Bid - $0.07. 
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Table 1. Variable Deflnitions and Values 
Variable Definition Mean (s.d) 
Sex 1 if female 0.55 (0.50) 
Know 1 if subject expressed prior 0.12 (0.32) 
knowledge of bST. 
The variables Sfty, Tech, and Welf take values between: 
0 if not concerned 
4 if very concerned 
Sfty Index of the subject's concern for 3.13 (0.50) 
food safety. 
Tech Subject's attitude towards Genetic 2.17 (1.23) 
Engineering/Biotechnology 
Welf Subject's level of concern for 2.55 (1.16) 
animal welfare 
Regional Dummy Variables Number 
Calurb 1 if urban California 15 
Calrur 1 if rural California 15 
Iowa 1 if Iowa 15 
Mass. 1 if Massachusetts 15 
Total number of observations = 75 
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Table 2. Tw'o-stage Analysis of First Bids 
Variable .Probit Cr 1=75) .OLS (n =42) 
Intercept 1.35 (1.22) 0.12 (0.18) 
Sex -0.26 (-0.76) 0.48 (0.62) 
Sfty -0.57 (-1.45) 0.57 (0.34) 
Tech 0.35 (2.17) -0.26 (-0.25) 
Know -0.11 (-0.22) -0.05 (-0.10) 
Welf -0.01 (-0.01) 0.21 (2.32) 
Calurb 0.34 (0.69) -0.65 (-0.64) 
Calrur -0.19 (-0.40) -0.11 (-0.15) 
Iowa -0.30 (-0.61) 0.19 (0.19) 
Mass. 0.07 (0.15) -0.24 (-0.73) 
\ -1.97 (-0.38) 
= 0.09 0.35 
Log Likelihood -47.95 -28.63 
% Correct 65.33 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. 
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Table 3. Effect of Information - First-stage Probit Analysis of Stabilized Bids 
Variable Eqn.l fn= 150) Eqn.2 (•n= 150) 
Intercept 1.78 (2.21) 2.56 (2.09) 
Sex -0.51 (-2.04) 0.01 (0.02) 
Sfty -0.53 (-1.90) -0.74 (-1.74) 
Tech 0.29 (2.58) 0.24 (1.43) 
Know 0.12 (0.34) 0.28 (0.51) 
Welf 0.04 (0.37) -0.01 (-0.08) 
Calurb 0.09 (0.26) 0.21 (0.39) 
Calrur -0.29 (-0.78) -0.08 (-0.14) 
Iowa -0.97 (-2.67) -0.94 (-1.81) 
Mass. 0.05 (0.14) 0.08 (0.16) 
Dummy -1.37 (-0.82) 
DSex -1.06 (-2.02) 
DSfty 0.34 (0.59) 
DTech 0.14 (0.58) 
DKnow -0.27 (-0.36) 
DWelf 0.10 (0.46) 
DCalurb -0.17 (-0.22) 
DCalrur -0.38 (-0.51) 
DIowa -0.19 (-0.25) 
DMass. -0.05 (-0.07) 
R2 = 0.14 0.21 
Log Likelihood -88.06 -82.39 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. 
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Table 4. Effect of Information - Second-stage OLS Analysis of Stabilized Bids 
Variable Eqn.l Cn: =95) Eqn.2 Cn' =95) 
Intercept -0.74 (-0.95) -0.16 (-0.23) 
Sex 1.56 (1.64) -0.05 (-0.24) 
Sfty 1.70 (1.68) 0.01 (0.03) 
Tech -0.86 (-1.52) 0.10 (0.96) 
Know -0.73 (-1.86) -0.27 (-0.93) 
Welf 0.14 (1.09) 0.29 (3.22) 
Calurb 0.20 (0.61) 0.48 (1.69) 
Calrur 0.51 (0.81) -0.48 (-1.79) 
Iowa 4.11 (1.95) 0.52 (1.62) 
Mass. 0.31 (1.14) 0.40 (1.52) 
\ -6.47 (-1.73) 
R2 = 
Log Lilcelihood 
0.33 
-111.98 
0.31 
-113.64 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. 
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CHAPTERS. GENERAL SUMMARY 
In this thesis we used laboratory experimental auctions to investigate factors related 
to consumer acceptability of two new food products. The experimental auction used real 
food, real money, and included an explicit obligation to consume a food product. 
Because the experiment closely replicates consumer purchase behavior, results are more 
reliable than those from hypothetical surveys. 
In the first paper we investigated acceptability of irradiated pork by conducting a 
survey followed by an experiment. Participants in both survey and experiment were 
asked how much they would be willing to pay to upgrade from non-irradiated pork to 
irradiated pork (and vice versa). The relationship between bids in the hypothetical survey 
and those in the experimental auction facilitated the formulation of a simple calibration 
function which we applied to the hypothetical bids of subjects who did not participate in 
the experiment. The results showed: (1) a high level of acceptability for irradiated pork 
(preferred by 75 percent of respondents), (2) that hypothetical bids in general 
overestimated true willingness-to-pay, and (3) that overestimation of hypothetical bids 
was more pronounced among participants bidding to avoid irradiated pork. 
Paper 2 investigated how different descriptions (favorable and unfavorable) of the 
food irradiation process influenced willingness-to-pay for irradiated pork. The results 
showed, as expected, that the favorable description caused bids to increase, and the 
unfavorable description caused bids to decrease. We discovered that when participants 
were given both the favorable and unfavorable descriptions, the unfavorable description 
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dominated. This result demonstrates the effectiveness of the anti-irradiation campaign. 
Negative information, because it succeeds in placing doubts in consumers minds about 
irradiation, convinces fhem to stick with the (non-irradiated) status quo. This shows that, 
given the current situation, major food processors are justified in their decision to avoid 
food irradiation. 
The third paper examined acceptability of milk from cows treated with bovine 
somatotropin (bST). The objectives were to determine (a) the overall level of 
acceptability of the product, (b) regional differences in acceptability, (c) the effect on 
acceptability of providing a detailed description of the product, and (d) the relationship 
between acceptability and socioeconomic and anthropomorphic factors. The results 
showed significant differences in acceptability among the five groups of participants. 
Initially, bids to avoid "bST milk" were highest in urban California but additional 
information about bST resulted in a significant drop in those bids. The bidding patterns 
we observed over repeated trials demonstrated the importance of the information context 
in which bids are elicited and the likely inadequacies of "one-shot" survey methods. 
These papers demonstrate the suitability of experimental auctions as a tool for 
investigating consumer acceptability of new products. The auction is realistic because it 
closely replicates consumer point-of-purchase behavior. It is also flexible because it 
permits alternative informational structures, and facilitates a quantification of the effects 
of additional or alternative information. By providing a well defined measure of 
acceptability (willingness-to -pay) it also allows estimation of the effects of socioeconomic 
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or other characteristics. In combination with surveys and appropriate calibration 
methods, experimental auctions have a potentially wider application in the valuation of 
public goods. 
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